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ABSTRACT 
Our nation’s ability to respond to natural or man-made 
disasters has remained relatively unchanged since the 
attacks of 9/11.  Current response operations are 
characterized by the inability to efficiently produce a 
collaborative and effective response to incidents of 
national significance and address the challenges of the 
Information Age.   The military has adapted network-centric 
tenants and principles from business applications to 
effectively operate in the Information Age and increase 
mission effectiveness.  These tenants and principles can be 
adapted by responders to address current deficiencies and 
increase mission effectiveness.  Implementation of 
“network-centric response” is both technologically and 
organizationally feasible.  Network-centric response 
operations would allow responders to meet the challenges 
and leverage the opportunities of the Information Age, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented 
shock and suffering in the history of the United 
States.  The nation was unprepared.  At 8:46 on 
the morning of September 11, 2001, the United 
States became a nation transformed.1  
- The 9/11 Commission Report 
 
Much of the post-9/11 transformation has focused on 
the nation’s ability to respond to attacks that occur 
despite our best efforts to prepare for and prevent attacks 
on the homeland.  There have been no significant man-made 
attacks that have reached the homeland since 9/11, although 
several have been disrupted and terrorist groups are 
actively seeking new ways to attack the United States and 
our allies.  Nonetheless, unpreventable natural disasters, 
in the form of wildfires and a series of hurricanes, 
cumulating with the landfall of Hurricane Katrina on August 
29, 2005, have caused significant destruction and suffering 
domestically.  Natural disasters that feature large 
geographic footprints and powerful destructive effects will 
continue to occur in the future.  Eventually, our efforts 
to deter and prevent man-made attacks will fail.  When 
acknowledging these factors, coupled with the ongoing 
pursuit of and advancements in weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) technology by non-state terrorist organizations and 
their state sympathizers, the United States should expect  
 
 
1  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report - Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States - 
Executive Summary (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
[2004], 1). 
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its ability to respond to the effects of disasters of 
national significance, regardless of origins, to be tested 
repeatedly for the foreseeable future.   
 
A. A MANDATE FOR A COLLABORATIVE NATIONAL APPROACH TO 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
 
In the years following the attacks of 9/11, the 
President issued several Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives (HSPDs) to provide strategic guidance for our 
nation to be able to better deal with the new threats of a 
post-9/11 world.  Among the directives issued were HSPD-5, 
whose stated purpose is “to enhance the ability of the 
United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing 
a single, comprehensive national incident management 
system” and HSPD-8, whose stated purpose is to establish 
“policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United 
States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual 
domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved 
delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and 
local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen 






2  George W. Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, 
Management of Domestic Incidents" www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-
5.html (accessed January 29, 2006), 1; George W. Bush, "Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-8, “National Preparedness”," 
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html (accessed January 29, 2006),1. 
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1. A Comprehensive Approach: The National Response 
Plan and the National Incident Management System  
HSPD-5 states as its policy, “To prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies, the United States 
Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach 
to domestic incident management.  The objective of the 
United States Government is to ensure that all levels of 
government across the Nation have the capability to work 
efficiently and effectively together, using a national 
approach to domestic incident management.”3  HSPD-5 led to 
the development of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) that detail how 
to respond to disasters on strategic and tactical levels 
respectively.  Despite the publication of these documents, 
individual states, counties, and major metropolitan areas 
differ on their level of NIMS compliance.  Tactical 
execution of response plans often varies even among 
entities within the same metropolitan area.  These 
practices result in a lack of synergy in response among 
tenant response agencies, the inability to organize and 
coordinate an effective, non-redundant response effort, and 
inefficiencies in the efforts of supporting agencies, 
whether neighboring states or federal entities, to provide 
assistance due to incompatibility of equipment and 
procedures as evidenced by the response efforts from 9/11 
through Hurricane Katrina.  According to the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina, “Local first responders were 
largely overwhelmed and unable to perform their duties, and 
 
3  Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, “Management of 
Domestic Incidents”, 1. 
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the National Response Plan did not adequately provide a way 
for federal assets to quickly supplement or, if necessary, 
supplant first responders.”4  While these documents have 
established a framework for a single, comprehensive 
national incident management system, they fail to discuss 
the specific processes, tactics, techniques, procedures, 
and methodology to be used to achieve a collaborative and 
unified effort within the NRP and NIMS framework. 
 
2. Standardization and Interoperability 
HSPD-8 is a companion to HSPD-5, which “identifies 
steps for improved coordination in response to incidents.”5  
HSPD-8 states that “The Secretary [of Homeland Security], 
in coordination with State and local officials, first 
responder organizations, the private sector and other 
Federal civilian departments and agencies, shall establish 
and implement streamlined procedures for the ongoing 
development and adoption of appropriate first responder 
equipment standards that support nationwide 
interoperability and other capabilities consistent with the 
national preparedness goal….”6  The lack of communications 
interoperability remains a subject of intense debate as 
individual States and communities seek independent 
solutions to their communications problems.  The  National 
Interoperability Baseline Survey, release by SAFECOM in 
 
4  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final Report 
of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, [February 15, 2006]), 1. 
5  Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, “National 
Preparedness”, 3. 
6  Ibid. 
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December 2006, states that, “longstanding obstacles to 
interoperability, including turf battles, lack of funding 
and political will for the development of shared radio 
communications systems, lack of common standards, and 
shortfalls in spectrum available to public safety, 
continued to hamper public safety communications.  Over the 
years [since a 1998 National Institute of Justice 
Interoperability Study], as these obstacles were addressed, 
lack of interoperability continued to result in the 
unnecessary loss of lives and property.  As the 
catastrophic event of September 11, 2001 showed the entire 
Nation, direct correlation exists between effective 
communications interoperability and first responders’ 
ability to save lives.”7   
Interoperable communications leading to the ability to 
provide uninterrupted flow of critical information among 
responding multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional 
agencies at all levels of government, is a priority 
capability.8  “Communications interoperability underpins the 
ability of federal, state, local, and tribal entities to 
work together effectively to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies.”9  Systems “stove piping” 
is not limited to just communication systems but is 
pervasive throughout all types of first response systems 
 
7  Department of Homeland Security, 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey (Washington DC: SAFECOM, Department of Homeland 
Security,[2006]), 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/background/1295_2006natio
nal.htm (accessed December 11, 2006), 2. 
8  Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance 
(Washington DC: DHS, [2005]) (accessed June 16, 2006). 
9  Ibid., 30. 
6 
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and responder procedures.  This practice works in direct 
opposition to National Preparedness Guidance target 
capabilities of expanded regional collaboration, 
strengthening information sharing and collaboration 
capabilities and strengthening interoperable communications 
capabilities to enable personnel from different disciplines 
and jurisdictions to communicate, share information, and 
collaborate effectively during the response to a major 
event.10
Almost four years passed between the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 and the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf 
region.  During this period, several measures have been 
implemented in an attempt to improve this nation’s ability 
to respond to disasters of national significance.  
Initiatives include, the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and a new Secretary; the standup of 
a new military combatant command, United States Northern 
Command, whose mission set includes Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities who are tasked with responding to 
domestic disasters; the issuance of fourteen Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives; the formulation and 
implementation of a National Incident Management System; 
development and publication of numerous National Strategy 
Documents, including the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support; and the publication of the National Response Plan.  
Despite these efforts directed at increasing our nation’s 
homeland security in the areas of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery and accomplishing the strategic 
e the damage and recover from attacks  
10  Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance 
(Washington DC: DHS, [2005]) (accessed June 16, 2006). 
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that occur, our nation’s ability to respond to natural or 
man-made disasters has remained relatively unchanged since 
the attacks of 9/11.11
 
3. Analog Response in a Digital World 
Recent analysis of the attacks of 9/11 specifically 
states that transferability of information for the purpose 
of reducing human exposure to the attacks, and hence its 
consequences, was extremely limited by the capacity and 
compatibility of communication networks in spite of the 
fact that facilities were made available to support 
expanded capacity.  Information transfer is a vital 
dimension of emergency services, and more attention is 
needed in this area.12
 
11  United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane 
Katrina:  Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 
Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters (Washington DC: GAO,[2006]) 
(accessed June 3, 2006); George W. Bush, "National Strategy for 
Homeland Security," Washington, DC: The White House, July (2002), 1-72 
(accessed December 9, 2006); Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
Summary of Post 9/11 Reports "Lessons Learned" (Washington DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency,[2002]) (accessed November 27, 2006); 
United States Conference of Mayors, Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post 
Katrina: The State of America's Readiness (Washington DC: The U.S. 
Conference of Mayors,[2006]) (accessed November 27, 2006); Keith Bea, 
Emergency Management Preparedness Standards:  Overview and Options for 
Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,[2004]) 
(accessed November 27, 2006); Richard Grimmett, Terrorism: Key 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Recent Major Commissions and 
Inquiries (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,[2004]) 
(accessed November 27, 2006); First Response Coalition, A Failure to 
Communicate: A Stocktake of Government Inaction to Address 
Communications Interoperability Failures Following Hurricane Katrina 
(Washington DC: The First Response Coalition,[2005]) (accessed November 
30, 2006); United States Government Accountability Office, Catastrophic 
Disasters:  Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 
Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery System (Washington DC: GAO,[2006]) (accessed 
November 14, 2006). 
12  Rae Zimmerman, "Public Infrastructure Service Flexibility for 
Response and Recovery in the Attacks at the World Trade Center, 
  September 11, 2001," Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems, 
Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University, 
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/sp/sp39/sept11book_ch9_zimmerman.pdf 
(accessed February 12, 2006). 
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The Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina listed 
among the finding in their final report “massive 
communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for 
alternatives impaired response efforts, command and 
control, and situational awareness.  Massive inoperability 
had the biggest effect on communications, limiting command 
and control, situational awareness, and federal, state, and 
local officials’ ability to address unsubstantiated media 
reports.”13
Even though inoperability severely affected response 
operations in the wake of Katrina’s destruction, equipment 
incompatibility remained an issue four years after the 
attacks of 9/11.  As stated in the Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, “Although Federal, 
State, and local agencies had communications plans and 
assets in place, these plans and assets were neither 
sufficient nor adequately integrated to respond effectively 
to the disaster.  Many available communications assets were 
not utilized fully because there was no national, State-
wide, or regional communications plan to incorporate 
them.”14  “Federal, State, and local governments have not 
yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve 
operability and interoperability to meet the needs of 
emergency responders.  This inability to connect multiple 
communications plans and architectures clearly impeded 
coordination and communication at the Federal, State, and 
 
13  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 3. 
14  The White House, "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned," (February 23, 2006), 55. 
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local levels.  A comprehensive, national emergency 
communications strategy is needed to confront the 
challenges of incorporating existing equipment and 
practices into a constantly changing technological and 
cultural environment.”15
The results of the 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey reinforce the fact that the nation has yet 
to achieve acceptable levels of interoperability for 
response operations.  According to the survey, “Strategic 
plans for interoperability are the exception rather than 
the norm.  Only 20 percent of agencies have strategic plans 
to ensure interoperability across disciplines, and 19 
percent have plans to ensure interoperability across 
jurisdictions.”16  About half of all agencies either do not 
use Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or rely on 
informal SOPs to support interoperable communications.17  
Only 37 percent of primary wireless communications systems 
used by first responders are multi-agency, multi-
jurisdictional, shared systems and 58 percent of all 
systems are limited to analog communications.18  The 
inability to communicate and share information effectively 
within and among organizations remains critical to the 
ability to respond effectively to disasters. 
The attacks of 9/11 caused the country to reevaluate 
its ability to respond to disasters of national 
significance.  Despite sweeping organizational changes at 
 
15  Ibid., 56. 
16  Department of Homeland Security, 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey, 23. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Department of Homeland Security, 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey, 23. 
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the Federal, State, and local level; massive funding of 
homeland security initiatives; and national attention, the 
response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that agencies 
continue to suffer from the inability to communicate, share 
information, and produce a collaborative effort that 
characterized to response to the attacks of 9/11.  The 
failure of local, State, and Federal governments to respond 
more effectively to Katrina, which had been predicted in 
theory for many years, and forecast with startling accuracy 
for five days, demonstrates that whatever improvements have 
been made to our capacity to respond to natural or man-made 
disasters, more than five years after 9/11, we are still 
not fully prepared despite significant emphasis and 
funding.19  “The preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina show we are still an analog government in a digital 
age.  We must recognize that we are woefully incapable of 
storing, moving, and accessing information, especially in 
times of crisis.”20  This is an indicator that, unlike 
business and military operations, our nation’s response 
operations and methodologies have failed to evolve to 
account for the new challenges present in the Information 
Age. 
 
B. RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
“National emergency response is a strategic problem, 
and at the strategic level, thought should always precede 
 
19  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1-364. 
20  Ibid. 
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action.  Spending money without an overarching systems 
architecture and a comprehensive acquisition program will 
be both wasteful and counterproductive.”21
Our current response operations are characterized by 
the inability to efficiently produce a collaborative and 
effective response to incidents of national significance 
and address challenges of Information Age. 
Efficiency in response refers to the extent to which 
maximum output is achieved from a given input, or minimum 
input for a given output.  Collaboration, in this context, 
is defined as a mutually beneficial, well-defined effort 
between and among entities through which they work together 
to achieve common goals.  The collaborative process 
involves individuals, organizations, and systems working 
together, but at a significantly higher degree than through 
the individual pursuit of common goals that characterizes 
current response operations. 
The Information Age is defined as the current stage in 
societal development which began to emerge at the end of 
the twentieth century, after approximately 1970, and 
followed the Industrial Age.  This period is marked by the 
increased production, transmission, consumption of, and 
reliance on information.  Challenges in this age are 
derived from our capability to collect, process, 
disseminate, and utilize information.  “Despite 
considerable advances in our ability to process 
information, these advances have not been rapid enough to 
keep pace with the increases in collection.  Humans are 
 
21  J. J. Carafano, "Preparing Responders to Respond: The Challenges 
to Emergency Preparedness in the 21st Century," Heritage Lectures, no. 
812 (2003), 1 (accessed November 27, 2006), 1. 
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still required to make sense of what is collected.  That 
will remain the case for sometime to come.”22  The ability 
to access useful information on the intended subject, 
anywhere, anytime, remains an ongoing challenge, especially 
when attempting to complete time-critical tasks with high-
stakes consequences such as those encountered in response 
operations. 
“Technology is bridging distances and providing the 
capability for individuals to be able to interact with each 
other in increasingly sophisticated ways, making it easier 
for individuals and organizations to share information, to 
collaborate on tasks, and to synchronize actions or 
effects.  But technological advances alone do not define 
the Information Age.”23  Of ultimate importance is what is 
being done with these newly provided technical 
capabilities: enabling individuals and organizations to 
create value in new ways.24
 
1. The Four Basic Tasks 
Numerous official after-action reports of the response 
operations following the attacks of 9/11 and disasters 
leading up to and including the response to Hurricane 
Katrina highlight weaknesses in the ability to effectively 
access and share information, voice or data, in the 
national response infrastructure that have permeated 
response operations and the resulting effects on mission 
 
22  D. S. Alberts and others, Understanding Information Age Warfare 
(Washington DC: DoD Command and Control Research, 2001), 44. 
23  Ibid., 44-45. 
24  Ibid. 
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accomplishment.25  The various Federal, State, and local 
entities that were charged with responding to significant 
disasters, whether man-made or natural, that impacted their 
jurisdiction suffered from the inability to perform the 
four basic tasks required to accomplish their mission in 
the Information Age.   
The four basic tasks are: 
1) The ability to make sense of the situation; 
2) The ability to work in a interagency 
collaborative environment;  
3) Possession of the appropriate means to respond; 
and  
4) The ability to orchestrate the means to respond 
in a timely manner.26   
The existence and employment of interoperable and 
effective voice and data communications and the use of 
 
25  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1-364; United States 
Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina:  Better Plans and 
Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic 
Natural Disasters, 1-68; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States (The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report 
(Washington DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States,[2004]); The White House, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 1-217; Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Summary of Post 9/11 Reports "Lessons Learned," 1-23; United 
States Conference of Mayors, Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post 
Katrina: The State of America's Readiness, 1-12; Bea, Emergency 
Management Preparedness Standards:  Overview and Options for Congress, 
1-22; Grimmett, Terrorism: Key Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
and Recent Major Commissions and Inquiries, 1-38; United States Fire 
Administration, Four Years Later - A Second Needs Assessment of the 
U.S. Fire Service (Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
[2006]) (accessed November 23, 2006). 
26  D. S. Alberts and R. E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: 
Command...Control...in the Information Age (Washington DC: DoD Command 
and Control Research, 2003), 98. 
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compatible technology for information sharing directly 
affect all but the third of the four basic tasks required 
to effectively operate in the Information Age.  Possession 
of the appropriate means to respond to disasters has more 
to do with core mission planning, manning, funding, 
training, and equipment procurement than a specific 
requirement for information sharing through connectivity 
and networking.  However, a high degree of shared 
situational awareness and network and communications 
connectivity will allow decision makers to identify which 
organizations, units, or individuals possess the 
appropriate means to respond (i.e., force or equipment 
capability combined with the ability to apply these assets 
in time and space based on their geographic position 
relative to when and where they are needed).  Even if a 
particular organization lacks the appropriate means to 
respond, they can request assistance from an interagency 
partner who possesses the appropriate capabilities and can 
be quickly identified and directed to assist in the 
response. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Can network-centric operations be employed by response 
agencies at all levels of government to allow them to 
accomplish the four basic tasks required to operate in the 
Information Age?  If so, will this lead to improved 





                    
1. Network-Centric Operations 
Given the complex and demanding requirements of 
responding to a determined, protracted, and potentially 
catastrophic terrorist threat, the fundamental requirement 
of an effective national response system may be to adopt a 
"system of systems" or network-centric approach to 
emergency preparedness.27  “Network-centric operations 
generate increased operational effectiveness by networking 
sensors, decision makers, and emergency responders to 
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater efficiency, increased 
security and safety, reduced vulnerability to potential 
hostile action, and a degree of self-synchronization.  In 
essence, this means linking knowledgeable entities in the 
response to emergencies from the local to the national 
level.”28  “Such a system might produce significant 
efficiencies in terms of sharing skills, knowledge, and 
scarce high-value assets, building capacity and redundancy 
in the national emergency response system, as well as 
gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture 
to all responders and being able to readily share 
information.  Network-centric systems might be especially 
valuable for responding to large-scale or multiple WMD 
attacks, where responders will have to surge capacity 
quickly, adapt to difficult and chaotic conditions, and 
respond to unforeseen requirements.”29
 
 
27  Carafano, Preparing Responders to Respond: The Challenges to 
Emergency Preparedness in the 21st Century, 6. 
28  Ibid., 6-7. 
29  Carafano, Preparing Responders to Respond: The Challenges to 
Emergency Preparedness in the 21st Century, 7. 
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2. Measurement of Effectiveness 
Measurable criteria are critical to assessing the 
impact of adapting network-centric principles to response 
operations.  Response agencies’ ability to complete the 
four basic tasks required to accomplish their mission in 
the Information Age should be evaluated by assessing the 
measures of effectiveness listed in Table 1. 
 
Basic Tasks Measures of Effectiveness 




The ability to work in a 
interagency collaborative 
environment 
Ability to Effectively Access 
and Share Information 
Possession of the appropriate 
means to respond 
Collective Situational 
Awareness 
The ability to orchestrate the 
means to respond in a timely 
manner  
Self-synchronization and Speed 
of Command and Decision Making  
 
Table 1.   Response Elements to be Evaluated 
 
The specific metrics to evaluate each element will be 
discussed at the end of Chapter V. 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
 
On the most basic level, we need to take a step 
back and focus on the fundamental question: Why 
was the Department of Homeland Security created?  
It was not created merely to bring together 
different agencies under a single tent.  It was 
created to enable these agencies to secure the 
homeland through joint, coordinated action. Our 
challenge is to realize that goal to the greatest 
extent possible.   
17 
                    
- Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff 
Statement for the Record before the United States 
Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security         
April 20, 2005.30
 
The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina implicitly cites the need to improve response 
capabilities that could be addressed by implementation of 
network-centric operations.31  The continued massive funding 
of incremental change that has characterized the years 
since 9/11 will not produce significant improvements in our 
nation’s ability to respond to incidents of national 
significance and to deal with the challenges of the 
Information Age.  Just as other disciplines (e.g., business 
corporations and the military) have adapted to the 21st 
Century, emergency response operations and agencies require 
a transformational change to adapt to the challenges of the 
Information Age and leverage it opportunities. 
While network-centric operations tenants, principles, 
and technology have the potential to be effectively applied 
to enhance the efforts of Federal, regional, State, and 
local personnel in both the areas of prevention and 
response, this thesis will be limited to the area of 
response.  The area of response was chosen because 
responders must manage the effects of time pressure and 
 
30  Secretary Chertoff as quoted in Peter Kind and Katharine Burton, 
Information Sharing and Collaboration Business Plan (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, [2005]) (accessed November 
27, 2006). 
31  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1-364. 
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completeness of information while making decisions and 
taking action to prevent loss of life and property. 
Prevention, like deterrence, is a difficult discipline 
to assess using metrics.  Did an attack fail to occur due 
to prevention or did other factors come into play?  
Response can and has been assessed by both congressional 
committees and first responder communities themselves.  The 
results of these assessments are well-documented and are 
suitable for scholarly analysis.  The documentation of 
deficiencies in current response operations must be 
accomplished to determine if the benefits of network-
centric operations can be used to fill current gaps in 
response. 
Case studies of efforts in response to the attacks of 
9/11 in New York City and the effects of Hurricane Katrina 
throughout the Gulf region should provide specific details 
of historical and current inefficiencies and deficiencies 
in response.  The two main case studies were selected to 
benchmark the recent evolution of response capability for 
several reasons:  date of occurrence, footprint of the 
disaster’s effects, and scope of response.  The dates of 
these two disasters span a significant period of four years 
that has included significant efforts to better equip this 
nation to prepare for and respond to national disasters.  
Simply, they form bookends that represent an awakening in 
national attention to the problem of terrorism and dealing 
with its consequences and the accumulation four years of 
this nation’s efforts to increase its ability to respond to 
significant disasters, regardless of their source.  The 
contrast in the footprint and scope of response to each 
disaster is used to show the consistencies in deficiencies 
19 
in the ability to gain and maintain situational awareness, 
work in an interagency collaborative environment, and to 
orchestrate the means to respond in a timely manner.  The 
attacks of 9/11 in New York were confined to a relatively 
small area, the World Trade Center complex, and were 
responded to by one of the largest, best-equipped and 
prepared first responder communities in the nation.  The 
initial damage mechanism and loss of life occurred over the 
period of a few hours.  Hurricane Katrina’s effects were 
distributed over several states and involved a significant 
federal contribution to response operations to support the 
efforts of responders from several diverse states and 
municipalities.  Its effects took days to manifest 
themselves and the loss of life continued for several days.  
The lasting effects and recovery phase of each event 
continue to this day. 
Once current deficiencies are documented, it is 
essential to establish the applicability and benefit of 
network-centric operations tenants, principles, and 
technology to response operations.  A detailed examination 
of how the military has adapted network-centric operations 
from the business world and is effectively applying its 
tenants and principles to the conduct of warfare will 
demonstrate the benefits of adopting network-centric 
operations to achieve positive transformational change.  
The strengths of network-centric warfare will be aligned 
with the deficiencies in current response operations to 
present a convincing value proposition for the adaptation 
of network-centric tenants, principles, and technology to 
establish a new methodology of performing response 
operations as a nation:  network-centric response. 
20 
                    
Determining the applicability of network-centric 
response to increase the capability of Federal, State, 
regional and local personnel in responding to an incident 
of national significance requires the definition of clearly 
articulated outcomes in a defined context.  The defined 
context of the increased capability will be the four basic 
tasks to operate in the Information Age.  The clearly 
articulated outcomes to be measured will be derived from 
the existing network-centric operations conceptual 
framework that includes:  quality of organic information, 
quality of individual information, quality of individual 
sensemaking, quality of individual decisions, quality of 
networking, degree of information sharing, quality of 
interactions, degree of shared sensemaking, quality of 
collaborative decisions, degree of decision 
synchronization, and degree of action/entities synchronized 
as they contribute to the overall degree of effectiveness 
of response.32
Once the applicability of network-centric operations 
to response is established, the challenges of a credible 
implementation strategy must addressed to include the 
technical and organizational feasibility of making the 
transformational, vice incremental, evolution of national 
response to a network-centric based approach.  
Implementation should be guided by a specific set of core 
values to ensure that network-centric tenants and 
principles are correctly adapted to response operations as  
 
 
32  D. S. Alberts and J. J. Garstka, "Network Centric Operations 
Conceptual Framework Version 2.0," U.S. Office of Force Transformation 
and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration (2004) (accessed October 2, 2006). 
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intended while avoiding potential bureaucratic 
appropriation and exploitation.  Core values represented 
include: 
• Empowerment - of responders at all levels in the 
social, cognitive, information and physical 
domains of response.33  Most response operations 
involve a local lead that is reinforced at the 
State, regional and Federal levels.  All levels 
of response organizations must understand their 
roles and be employed effectively to sustain a 
decisive unity of effort and make decisions at 
the lowest level possible. 
• Service – through a dedication to mission 
accomplishment by placing the welfare of our 
fellow citizens above our own without the 
expectation of recognition or personal gain. 
• Transparency - of operations and decision making 
at all levels to reinforce trust and coordination 
among disparate agencies that represent various 
levels of government and the private sector. 
• Speed - of understanding and decision making.  
The preservation of life and infrastructure in 
the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic event 
has a significant temporal component.  Proper 
naturalistic decision making processes rely on  
 
 
 33  Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington DC: 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
[January 5, 2005]). 
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rapid assimilation of the situation and an 
effective application of human and material 
resources. 
• Agility – characterized by the ability of 
response forces, supporting agencies, and 
decision makers to be robust, flexible, 
responsive, innovative, resilient, and adaptive 
in a dynamic environment.  
• Teamwork - through synchronization of individual 
assets to contribute to the collective response 
effort.  Self-synchronization increases value of 
individual initiative to produce a meaningful 
increase in operational tempo and responsiveness 
and allows rapid adaptation to dynamic events as 
they unfold.34 
If network-centric operational theory holds true, a 
robustly networked team of interagency responders will 
improve information sharing; information sharing will 
enhance the quality of information and shared situational 
awareness; shared situational awareness will enable 
collaboration and self-synchronization, which enhances  
sustainability and speed of command and decision making.  
These, in turn, will dramatically increase response mission 
effectiveness.35
  34  Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington DC: 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
[January 5, 2005]). 
35 Adapted from the benefits of network-centric warfare contained in 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The 
Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington DC: Director, 
Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,         
[January 5, 2005]). 
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II. DOCUMENTED DEFICIENCIES IN RESPONSE 
It is a fair inference, given the differing 
situations in New York City and Northern 
Virginia, that the problems in command, control, 
and communications that occurred at both sites 
will likely recur in any emergency of similar 
scale.  The task looking forward is to enable 
first responders to respond in a coordinated 
manner with the greatest possible awareness of 
the situation.36
- The 9/11 Commission Report 
 
Insufficient planning, training, and interagency 
coordination are not problems that began and 
ended with Hurricane Katrina.  The storm 
demonstrated the need for greater integration and 
synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only 
throughout the Federal government, but also with 
the State and local governments and the private 
and non-profit sectors as well.37
- The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned 
 
The current deficiencies in response that prevent 
individual responders and organizations from completing the 
four basic tasks to accomplish their mission in the 
Information Age can broken down into the areas of 
communications, information sharing, situational awareness, 
collaboration, and establishment of a unified command.  The 
lack of interoperability affects each of these areas.   
Interoperability in response has two distinct 
components.  The first refers to the ability of voice and 
 
36  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report, 315. 
37  The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, 50. 
24 
                    
data systems, software applications, and networks to 
seamlessly exchange data in a way that it remains timely, 
accurate, consistent, and useful to response agencies and 
decision makers.  The second component of interoperability 
involves the ability of response agency forces to exchange 
equipment and services, through standardized techniques and 
procedures, without experiencing a reduction in the 
capability to perform their intended mission as a result of 




Communications interoperability refers to the ability 
of first responders to communicate to exchange voice and 
data information on demand, in real time, when needed, and 
as authorized.  When interoperability is fully realized, 
police, firefighters, emergency medical personnel and 
supporting agencies are able to communicate seamlessly to 
coordinate efforts during a routine incident, disaster 
situation, or special event.38  After-action reviews of the 
response efforts to major disasters during the period from 
the attacks of 9/11 through the response to Hurricane 
Katrina cite numerous deficiencies in our response efforts 
 
38  Department of Homeland Security, 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey, 2. 
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in the areas of interoperable and effective voice and data 
communications and the use of compatible technology.39   
The lack of interoperable wireless communications 
systems is an issue that continues to affect 
public safety agencies in communities across the 
county.  In many cases, agencies are unable to 
communicate or share critical voice and data 
information with other jurisdictions or 
disciplines during major events or even in day-
to-day operations.  The procurement and 
employment of interoperable communications, the 
ability to provide uninterrupted flow of critical 
information among responding multi-disciplinary 
and multi-jurisdictional agencies at all levels 
of government, is a priority capability.  
Communications interoperability underpins the 
ability of Federal, State, local, and tribal 
entities to work together effectively to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.  Analysis of State and Urban Area 
Homeland Security Strategies, in addition to a 
number of reports on the status of interoperable 
communications, reflects persistent shortfalls in 
achieving interoperability.40
According to a 2006 Department of Homeland Security 
report, most first responders in the country use analog 
communications systems and the majority of those systems 
 
39  United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane 
Katrina:  Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 
Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, 1-68; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Summary of Post 9/11 Reports "Lessons Learned," 1-
23; United States Conference of Mayors, Five Years Post 9/11, One Year 
Post Katrina: The State of America's Readiness, 1-12; Bea, Emergency 
Management Preparedness Standards:  Overview and Options for Congress, 
1-22; First Response Coalition, A Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake 
of Government Inaction to Address Communications Interoperability 
Failures Following Hurricane Katrina, 1-5; United States Government 
Accountability Office, Catastrophic Disasters:  Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the 
Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
System, 1-141. 
40  Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance, 
30. 
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are more than ten years old.41  Despite the presence of 
about 11 billion dollars in Department of Homeland Security 
grants to bolster communications, these deficiencies in the 
ability to effectively communicate lead to break downs in 
situational awareness and unity of effort, as characterized 
by a lack of information sharing and collaboration among 
interagency partners; the inability to establish a unified 
command; and, ultimately, a lack overall response mission 
effectiveness.42
Communications difficulties experienced during the 
response to the attacks of 9/11 in New York City include 
the lack of integrated communications and unified command 
contemplated in the City’s Office of Emergency Management 
directive; these problems existed both within and among 
individual responding agencies.43  “For a unified incident 
management system to succeed, each participant must have 
command and control of its own units and adequate internal 
communications.  This was not always the case at the World 
Trade Center (WTC) on 9/11.”44
“The task of accounting for and coordinating the 
[police and fire] units was rendered difficult, if not 
impossible, by internal communications breakdowns resulting 
from the limited capabilities of radios in the high-rise 
 
41  Department of Homeland Security, 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey, 1-50. 
42  Alan Joch, "Communications Breakdown, First Responders Look for 
New Ways to Keep Communications Flowing in Emergencies," FCW.com, 
http://www.fcw.com/article91601-12-05-05-Print (accessed June 9, 2006). 
43  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report, 319. 
44  Ibid. 
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environment of the WTC and from confusion over which 
personnel were assigned to which frequency.”45
The inability of the Fire Department, New York (FDNY) 
to coordinate and account for the different radio channels 
that would be used in an emergency of the scale of 9/11 at 
the WTC contributed to the early lack of units in the South 
Tower, whose lobby chief initially could not communicate 
with anyone outside that tower.46
Communications difficulties experienced during the 
response to Hurricane Katrina include a devastated 
communications infrastructure across the Gulf Coast that 
featured incapacitated telephone service, police and fire 
dispatch centers, and emergency radio systems.47  Almost 
three million customer phone lines were knocked out, 
telephone switching centers were seriously damaged, and 
1,477 cell towers were incapacitated.  Most of the radio 
stations and many television stations in the New Orleans 
area were knocked off the air.48
“The magnitude of the storm was such that the local 
communications system wasn’t simply degraded; it was, at 





45  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report, 319. 
46  Ibid. 
47  The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, 34. 
48  Ibid. 
49 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Paul McHale as 
quoted in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 
34. 
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Equipment interoperability problems further 
hindered an integrated response.  Similar issues 
of bifurcated operations and interoperability 
challenges were also present between the military 
and civilian leadership.  This lack of 
interoperable communications was apparent at the 
tactical level, resulting from the fact that 
emergency responders, National Guard, and active 
duty military use different equipment.50
“People could not communicate.  It got to the point 
that people were literally writing messages on paper, 
putting them in bottles and dropping them from helicopters 
to other people on the ground.”51
“There was no voice radio contact with surrounding 
parishes or State and Federal agencies.  Lives were put at 
risk and it created a direct operational impact on their 
ability to maintain control of a rapidly deteriorating 
situation within the city, carry out rescue efforts and 
control the evacuation of those who had failed to heed the 
call for evacuation.”52
The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and 
uncoordinated response that followed reawakened 
policymakers to the critical need for interoperable 
communications.  Commitments were made by policymakers to 
fix the problems of incompatibility, limited spectrum for 
response operations, and system survivability.  This was 
seen as a national problem that required a national 
 
50  The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, 43. 
51 Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the State 
Senate's homeland security committee as quoted in The Federal Response 
to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 37. 
52  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative:  Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1-364. 
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solution.  Similar commitments to first responders were 
made following the 9/11 tragedy that initially brought 
failure of the emergency communications system to the 
nation’s attention.  Yet, four years later, the same 
failures occurred.  Grants for systems procurement have 
already been made for 2007 without national standards or 
additional spectrum being issued.  According to the 
Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards Summary 
Report and Findings issued by DHS in January 2007 that 
assessed the maturity of tactical interoperable 
communications capabilities in 75 urban/metropolitan areas, 
more than $2.9 billion in grant assistance has been 
provided to State and local agencies for equipment and 
other projects to improve communications interoperability 
from FY 2003 through FY 2006 alone.53  
“… Barriers to interoperable communications are both 
technical and operational.  Each agency typically has its 
own unique legacy technologies, requirements, operating 
environments, laws, and processes. Therefore, achieving 
interoperability requires that, in addition to addressing 
technology and disparate communications systems, agencies 
examine governance, procedures, training, exercises, and 
usage.”54  Until the issues of communications equipment 
compatibility through non-proprietary standards, spectrum 




53  Department of Homeland Security, Tactical Interoperable 
Communications Scorecards Summary Report and Findings (Washington DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, [2007]), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grants-scorecard-report-010207.pdf 
(accessed January 4, 2007). 
54  Ibid. 
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communications planning are resolved, responder 
communications problems will continue for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
B. INFORMATION SHARING 
 
Improving information sharing constitutes a 
cornerstone of our nation’s ability to protect the American 
people and our institutions and to defeat terrorists and 
their support networks at home and abroad.55  The timely and 
accurate sharing of information is also critical to 
performing response operations.  The 9/11 Commission 
identified a breakdown in information sharing as a key 
factor contributing to the failure to predict and prevent 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.56  The 
lack of information sharing also contributed to some of the 
failures in response on that day. 
The role of the information sharing environment in 
response is to increase the quality of organic information, 
the quality of individual and collective sensemaking, the 
quality of networking, the degree synchronization, and the 
number of entities synchronized in pursuit of social 
knowledge building.57  In this way, data is contextualized 
and transformed into information, which is in turn shared, 
interpreted, and socially transformed into knowledge.  As 
 
55  Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan (Washington 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [Program Manager, 
Information Sharing Environment]) (accessed November 29, 2006). 
56  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report, 1-567. 
57  Kind and Burton, Information Sharing and Collaboration Business 
Plan, 8. 
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this knowledge is developed and integrated, it can be used 
by individuals and agencies to operate collaboratively.58
The inability to share information, either 
technically, procedurally, or organizationally, will lead 
to a lack of situational awareness, increased uncoordinated 
individual actions, delayed response times, and 
inappropriate responses as demonstrated by the effects of 
the lack of information sharing in the responses to the 
attacks of 9/11 and the effects of Hurricane Katrina. 
The lack of information sharing experienced during the 
response to the attacks of 9/11 in New York City includes 
the inability of the FDNY to coordinate the number of units 
dispatched to different points within the 16-acre complex.  
“As a result, numerous units were congregating in the 
undamaged Marriott Hotel and at the overall command post on 
West Street by 9:30, while chiefs in charge of the South 
Tower still were in desperate need of units.  With better 
understanding of the resources already available, 
additional units might not have been dispatched to the 
South Tower at 9:37.”59
“When the South Tower collapsed the overall FDNY 
command post ceased to operate, which compromised the 
FDNY's ability to understand the situation; an FDNY marine 
unit's immediate radio communication to FDNY dispatch that 
the South Tower had fully collapsed was not conveyed to 
chiefs at the scene.”60
 
58  Kind and Burton, Information Sharing and Collaboration Business 
Plan, 8. 
59  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(The 9/11 Commission), The 9/11 Commission Report, 319. 
60  Ibid. 
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“The command posts were in different locations, and 
Office of Emergency Management Headquarters, which could 
have served as a focal point for information sharing, did 
not play an integrating role in ensuring that information 
was shared among agencies on 9/11, even prior to its 
evacuation.”61
FDNY decision making capability was hampered by a lack 
of information from New York Police Department (NYPD) 
aviation:   
At 9:51 A.M., a helicopter pilot cautioned that 
“large pieces” of the South Tower appeared to be 
about to fall and could pose a danger to those 
below.  Immediately after the tower's collapse, a 
helicopter pilot radioed that news.  This 
transmission was followed by communications at 
10:08, 10:15, and 10:22 that called into question 
the condition of the North Tower.  The FDNY 
chiefs would have benefited greatly had they been 
able to communicate with personnel in a 
helicopter.62
“The FDNY, Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), 
and NYPD did not coordinate their units that were searching 
the WTC complex for civilians.  In many cases, redundant 
searches of specific floors and areas were conducted.”63
The lack of information sharing experienced during the 
response to Hurricane Katrina includes the fact that “no 
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forces that were on the way, the missions that had been 
resourced, and the missions that still needed to be 
completed.”64   
Local, State, and Federal officials were forced 
to depend on a variety of conflicting reports 
from a combination of media, government, and 
private sources, many of which continued to 
provide inaccurate or incomplete information 
throughout the day, further clouding the 
understanding of what was occurring in New 
Orleans.  In fact, some uncertainty about the 
specific causes and times of the breaches and 
overtoppings persists to this day.65
“At least two different locations were assigning 
search and rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots 
operating over New Orleans, and no one had the total 
picture….”66
The Department of Defense (DoD) had difficulty 
gaining visibility over supplies and commodities 
when the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) asked DoD to assume a significant portion 
of its logistics responsibilities.  However, 
because FEMA lacked the capability to maintain 
visibility from order through final delivery of 
the supplies and commodities it had ordered, DoD 
did not know the precise locations of the FEMA-
ordered supplies and commodities when it assumed 
FEMA’s logistics responsibilities.  As a result  
of its lack of visibility over the meals that 
were in transit, DoD had to airlift 1.7 million 




64  United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane 
Katrina:  Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 
Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, 1-68. 
65  The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, 35. 
66  United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane 
Katrina:  Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 
Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, 1-68. 
34 
                    
the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was 
concerned that food supplies were nearly 
exhausted.67
DoD possessed information at different classification 
levels, including critical surveillance and reconnaissance 
imagery and video products, that was unable to be shared 
with interagency partners to its storage on a classified 
system (i.e., SIPRNET). 
Despite spending some 50 billion dollars on 
information technology per year, two fundamental problems 
have prevented the Federal government from building an 
efficient government-wide information storage and 
distribution system.  First, government acquisition of 
information systems has not been routinely coordinated by 
either the establishment of operating standards or the 
restricted use of grant money to purchase interoperable 
equipment.  Over time, hundreds of new systems were 
acquired to address specific agency requirements.  Agencies 
have not pursued compatibility across the Federal 
government or with State and local entities which has 
resulted in islands of technology; distinct networks that 
obstruct efficient collaboration.68  Second, legal and 
cultural barriers often prevent agencies from exchanging 
and integrating information.  Information-sharing 
capabilities are similarly deficient at the State and local 
levels and require not only interoperable equipment and 
standards for use, but comprehensive cross-jurisdictional 
planning efforts.69
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C. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
 
Situational awareness is the capability to extract, or 
operate on, limited cues within a complex environment and 
use them to construct mental models of complex events that 
allows appropriate decisions to be made.70  Making sense of 
a situation begins with putting the available information 
about the situation into context and identifying the 
relevant patterns that exist.  Developing situation 
awareness has always been a challenge in response 
operations that feature the same uncertainty that is often 
referred to in warfare and “fog and friction”.  This 
implies that a 21st century force needs to be robustly 
networked with information management capabilities that 
enable widespread information sharing and support 
collaboration. 
Situational awareness goes beyond sharing information 
and identifying patterns to an understanding of what is 
currently occurring, what may occur in the future, and what 
actions can be taken in response.  This involves knowledge 
of the total available response assets, their location, 
their capabilities, and their current status.  Situational 
awareness allows for understanding the effects of a course 
of action before deciding on a particular option. 
Many first responders that were killed at the WTC on 
9/11 suffered from decreased situational awareness.  “At 
least 24 of the at most 32 companies who were dispatched to 
and actually in the North Tower received the evacuation 
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instruction-either via radio or directly from other first 
responders.”71  What was not made clear is that the South 
Tower had collapsed or that the North Tower was soon to 
collapse.  “Nevertheless, many of these firefighters died, 
either because they delayed their evacuation to assist 
civilians, attempted to regroup their units, lacked 
urgency, or some combination of these factors.  In 
addition, many other firefighters not dispatched to the 
North Tower also died in its collapse.”72  The 9/11 
Commission concluded that the technical failure of FDNY 
radios, while a contributing factor, was not the primary 
cause of the many firefighter fatalities in the North 
Tower.73  How much of a role the lack of situational 
awareness played remains undetermined.  Even with total 
awareness of the situation, many responders would have 
chosen to remain to help survivors of the initial attack.  
What is unclear is if that choice was clearly understood or 
consciously made by the responders that died that day. 
The Federal response to the effects of Hurricane 
Katrina suffered from significant organizational and 
coordination problems during the response period.  “The 
lack of communications and situational awareness had a 
debilitating effect on the Federal response.”74  
Even after coordinating elements were in place, 
Federal departments and agencies continued to have 
difficulty adapting their procedures to this catastrophic 
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incident.75  The storm demonstrated the need for greater 
integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, 
not only throughout the Federal government, but also with 
the State and local governments and the private and non-
profit sectors as well.76
Because of poor situational awareness and 
communications throughout evacuation operations, FEMA had 
difficulty transporting and delivering food, water, and 
other critical commodities to people waiting to be 
evacuated, most significantly at the Superdome.77
The Federal government lacked the timely, accurate, 
and relevant ground-truth information necessary to evaluate 
which critical infrastructures were damaged, inoperative, 
or both.  The FEMA teams that were deployed to assess 
damage to the regions did not focus on critical 
infrastructure and did not have the expertise necessary to 
evaluate protection and restoration needs.78
“As with Hurricane Andrew, an underlying problem was 
the failure to quickly assess damage and gain situational 
awareness.”79  “The NRP notes that local and State officials 
are responsible for damage assessments during a disaster, 
but it also notes that State and local officials could be 
overwhelmed in a catastrophe.  Despite this incongruous 
situation, the NRP did not specify the proactive means 
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necessary for the federal government to gain situational 
awareness when State and local officials are overwhelmed.”80
 
D. COLLABORATION  
 
Currently, there is a lack of standardized pre-
incident planning and coordination among State and local 
governments which impedes collaboration and the ability of 
the Federal government to effectively plan for and support 
State and local response efforts.  “Exasperating this 
situation, our States and territories has developed fifty-
six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty 
high-threat, high-density urban areas.”81
Individual agencies responding to the attacks of 9/11 
and the effects of Hurricane Katrina were unable to produce 
a unity of effort through collaborative action due to a 
lack of interoperability, communications compatibility, a 
lack of information sharing, low individual and 
organizational situational awareness, and the inability to 
establish a unified command structure. 
At the world trade center complex on 9/11, “there was 
a lack of comprehensive coordination between FDNY, NYPD, 
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attempting to respond to the attacks within their own 
context and understanding, little collaboration was 
achieved. 
The response to the effects of Hurricane Katrina 
involved significantly more agencies and jurisdictions than 
those charged with responding to the attacks of 9/11.  The 
additional aspect of a significant Federal response also 
increased the requirement for the various agencies to work 
in a collaborative manner. 
Despite this fact, the DHS did not establish its NRP-
specified disaster site multi-agency coordination center, 
the Joint Field Office (JFO), until after the height of the 
crisis.  Further, without subordinate JFO structures to 
coordinate Federal response actions near the major incident 
sites, Federal response efforts in New Orleans were not 
initially well-coordinated.83
The overall military support of civil authorities did 
not fair much better in the area of collaboration: 
In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, 
separate command structures for active duty 
military and the National Guard hindered their 
unity of effort.  United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) commanded active duty forces 
[through a Joint Task Force], while each State 
government commanded its National Guard forces.  
For the first two days of Katrina response 
operations, USNORTHCOM did not have situational 
awareness of what forces the National Guard had 
on the ground.  Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-
Katrina) simply could not operate at full 
efficiency when it lacked visibility of over half 
the military forces in the disaster area.  
Neither the Louisiana National Guard nor JTF-
Katrina had a good sense for where each other’s 
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forces were located or what they were doing.  For 
example, the JTF-Katrina Engineering Directorate 
had not been able to coordinate with National 
Guard forces in the New Orleans area.  As a 
result, some units were not immediately assigned 
missions matched to on-the-ground requirements.  
Further, FEMA requested assistance from DoD 
without knowing what State National Guard forces 
had already deployed to fill the same needs.84
To this day, requests for assistance under an 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreement, 
to include the use of National Guard forces in a Title 32 
(non-federalized) status, have no reporting requirements to 
the Federal government or DoD, which makes the anticipation 
of Federal requests and allocation of resources to support 
State and local efforts very difficult. 
Several functions were being untaken by individual 
agencies without knowledge of other agencies’ capabilities 
or efforts.  An example of the lack of collaboration among 
interagency partners is evident in search and rescue 
operations. 
Lacking an integrated search and rescue incident 
command, the various agencies were unable to 
effectively coordinate their operations.  This 
meant that multiple rescue teams were sent to the 
same areas, while leaving others uncovered.  When 
successful rescues were made, there was no formal 
direction on where to take those rescued.  Too 
often rescuers had to leave victims at drop-off 
points and landing zones that had insufficient 
logistics, medical, and communications resources, 
such as atop the I-10 cloverleaf near the 
Superdome.85
FEMA personnel are used to acting in an austere 
environment where resources drive deadlines.  Conversely, 
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DoD sets deadlines, and resources units accordingly.  FEMA 
planners at the tactical level do not understand the 
magnitude of the assets that DoD can bring to an operation, 
and thus are hesitant to ask for them.  FEMA operators are 
also tend to submit their requests in terms of what 
specific assets they desire instead requesting a particular 
capability or mission to be performed.  An example of this 
is a FEMA request for a Humvee and driver.  After being 
questioned by DoD personnel, it was learned that the 
vehicle was requested to drive an engineer around New 
Orleans to measure flood levels which would take all day, 
given the significant flooding in some areas.  By asking 
for a mission clarification, DoD representatives were able 
to change the request to one for a helicopter that could 
complete the time critical task in less than an hour. 
 Although individual organizations’ efforts to respond 
to the disasters in New York City and the Gulf region were 
well-intentioned and heroic, they did not produce the 
synergistic mission results that would have been achieved 
through effective collaboration. 
 
E. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED COMMAND 
 
It is important to distinguish between Unity of 
Command, desired by military organizations, and Unified 
Command, desired by emergency responders and dictated by 
the NIMS. 
Unity of command is the concept by which each person 
within an organization reports to one and only one  
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designated person.  The purpose of unity of command is to 
ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for 
every objective.86
Unified command is an application of the Incident 
Command System (ICS) that is used when there is more than 
one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents 
cross political jurisdictions.  Agencies work together 
through the designated members of the unified command, 
often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines 
participating in the unified command, to establish a common 
set of objectives, strategies, plans, priorities, and 
public communications.87  For incidents of national 
significance, the unified command consists of senior 
officials from multiple levels of government and provides 
for and enables joint decisions to be made collectively.88
“Recognizing that most incidents are managed locally, 
the command function under the ICS is set up at the lowest 
level of the response, and grows to encompass other 
agencies and jurisdictions as they arrive.  Some incidents 
that begin with a single response discipline (e.g., fire or 
police department) within a single jurisdiction may rapidly 
expand to multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional incidents 
requiring significant additional resources and operational 
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important and more complicated when local, State, and 
Federal commanders are required to coordinate their 
efforts.”90
The 9/11 Commission specifically stated that 
“significant shortcomings within the FDNY's command and 
control capabilities were painfully exposed on September 
11.”91  “Effective decision making in New York was hampered 
by problems in command and control and in its internal 
communications.”92  At the World Trade Center complex in New 
York City, “casualties were nearly 100% at and above the 
impact zones and were very high among first responders who 
stayed in danger as they tried to save lives.  Despite 
weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve 
unified incident command, and inadequate communications 
among responding agencies, all but one hundred of the 
thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone 
escaped, often with the help of emergency responders.”93  
New York City’s first responder communities continue to be 
some of the largest and best-equipped metropolitan response 
agencies in the world.  Despite their heroic efforts on 
9/11, many lives, especially among the first responder 
communities themselves, were lost due to a lack of network 
centricity in response infrastructure that was 
characterized by the inability to communicate, due to 
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incompatible communications technology and organizational 
biases; a lack of individual and shared awareness and 
sensemaking; the inability to effectively and quickly share 
and access information to build situational awareness; and 
the inability to establish a unified effort or command.94  
Although responders possessed the means to respond, they 
failed to complete the other three of the basic tasks 
required to effectively accomplish their mission when 
presented with the challenges of the Information Age. 
The NIMS and the ICS were established in the period 
after 9/11 and prior to Hurricane Katrina but were unable 
to produce the intended unified command structure due to 
the inability of agencies to communicate or share 
information.  This resulted in the breakdown in situational 
awareness with prevented a collaborative response and 
reduced overall emergency response mission effectiveness. 
Hurricane Katrina produced significant structural 
damage to building and significant flooding which combined 
with an inoperable and incompatible communications 
environment following the storm.   
Local emergency response officials found it 
difficult or impossible to establish functioning 
incident command structures in these conditions.  
Such structures would have better enabled local 
response officials to direct operations, manage 
assets, obtain situational awareness, and 
generate requests for assistance to State 
authorities.  Without an incident command  
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structure, it was difficult for local leaders to 
guide the local response efforts, much less 
command them.95   
Members of the Hammond (Louisiana) Fire Department 
reported receiving “a lot of ‘I don’t knows’ from [local] 
government officials”; another Louisiana firefighter 
stated, “the command structure broke down, we were 
literally left to our own devices.”96
“Eventually, over 50,000 National Guard members from 
fifty-four States, Territories, and the District of 
Columbia deployed to the Gulf Coast, providing critical 
response assistance during this week of crisis.  The robust 
active duty and National Guard response played a crucial 
role in the effort to bring stability to the areas ravaged 
by Hurricane Katrina.”97  While the National Guard and 
active duty military’s ability to fill the void in local 
and State response efforts was significant, the command 
structure was fragmented and could be characterized as 
having failed to establish military unity of command. 
“The standard National Guard deployment coordination 
between State Adjutants General was effective during the 
initial response but was insufficient for such a large-
scale and sustained operation.”98  “A fragmented deployment 
system and lack of an integrated command structure for both 
active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated 
communications and coordination issues during the initial 
response.  Deployments for Title 32 (National Guard) forces 
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were coordinated State-to-State through EMAC agreements and 
also by the National Guard Bureau.  Title 10 (active duty) 
force deployments were coordinated through USNORTHCOM.”99  
Once forces arrived in the Joint Operations Area, they fell 
under separate command structures, rather than one single 
command and made no attempt to establish formal information 
sharing and synchronize support efforts.  “The separate 
commands divided the area of operations geographically and 
supported response effort separately, with the exception of 
the evacuations of the Superdome and the Convention Center 
in New Orleans.”100  Title 32 and Title 10 forces continued 
to operate under separate chains of command throughout 
operation with no formal process to coordinate operations. 
The lack of collaboration between military units that 
were supporting response efforts was surprising to many 
observers.  Despite the military’s recent history of 
success in combat operations through unity of effort and 
collaboration among Services and coalition partners, 
network-centric operations, which are now the military’s 
main means of collaboration among combat forces, could not 
effectively be applied to support response operations in 
the Gulf Region.  Even if the military force had 
successfully employed network-centric operations within its 
own organization, the lack of technical, organizational, 
and procedural network-centricity among the supported civil 
authorities and response agencies would have limited the 
ability to effectively share information, develop  
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situational awareness, achieve self-synchronization, and 
produce a collaborative effort among agencies to improve 
mission effectiveness. 
Deficiencies in the areas of communications, 
information sharing, situational awareness, collaboration, 
and ability to establish a unified command ultimately 
prevented individual responders and supporting agencies 
from completing the four basic tasks to accomplish their 
mission in the Information Age in response to the attacks 
of 9/11 and the effects of Hurricane Katrina.  Failure to 
complete these tasks resulted in significantly reduced 
response mission effectiveness to include significant loss 
of life, property, and public trust in our nation’s ability 
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III. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE: THE MILITARY’S 
RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION AGE 
 
Continual change and the need to respond to it 
compels the commander to carry the whole 
intellectual apparatus of his knowledge with him.  
He must always be ready to bring forth the 
appropriate decision.  By total assimilation with 
his mind and life, the commander’s knowledge must 
be transformed into capability.101
- Carl von Clausewitz On War 
 
This chapter will examine the U.S. military’s 
adaptation of network-centric operations in the form of 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW).  The U.S. military continues 
to evolve into a highly efficient network-centric force 
through the application of NCW tenants, principles, and 
technologies to provide the military with increased 
situational awareness; efficient communications; rapid and 
standardized information exchange, asset location, and 
identification; unity of command and unity of effort; and, 
ultimately, increased warfighting mission effectiveness. 
 
A. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE DEFINED 
 
“NCW is about human and organizational behavior.  NCW 
is based on adopting a new way of thinking, network-centric 
thinking, and applying it to military operations.”102  “It 
focuses on attaining access, access to gather, process, and  
101  C. Clausewitz, On War [Vom Kriege], trans. and ed. M. Howard and 
P. Paret, Rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 
170. 
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Publications Distribution Center, 1999), 88 (accessed September 29, 
2006). 
50 
                    
manage information to take advantage of the growing power 
resident in information networks.  It facilitates the 
creation and sustaining of shared awareness at all command 
levels.”103  It is characterized by the ability of 
geographically dispersed forces to create a high level of 
shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited via 
self-synchronization and self-organization to accomplish 
time-critical tasks in accordance with command guidance.104  
“NCW supports speed of command, the conversion of superior 
information position to action.”105  NCW is transparent to 
mission, force size, and geography and has the potential to 
contribute to the coalescence of the tactical, operational, 
and strategic levels of war.106  “NCW is not narrowly about 
technology, but broadly about an emerging military response 




"Exploration of emergent social structures across 
domains of human activity and experience lead to an 
overarching conclusion: as a historical trend, dominant 
functions and processes in the information age are 
increasingly organized around networks.  Networks 
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constitute the new social morphology of our societies….”108  
“While the networking form of social organization has 
existed in other times and spaces, the new information 
technology paradigm provides the material basis for its 
pervasive expansion throughout the entire social 
structure."109
Many observers believe that a U.S. military 
transformation is necessary to ensure U.S. forces continue 
to operate from a position of overwhelming military 
advantage in support of national objectives.  They believe 
that DoD must transform to achieve a fundamentally joint, 
network centric, distributed force structure capable of 
rapid decision superiority.110  “To meet this goal, DoD is 
building doctrine, training, and procurement practices to 
create a culture of continual transformation that involves 
people, processes, and systems.”111
In their 1998 seminal article, Vice Admiral Arthur 
Cebrowski and John Garstka advocated adapting network-
centric operating principles from the business world and 
applying them to the art of warfare.112  They noted that: 
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Society has changed.  The underlying economics 
and technologies have changed.  American business 
has changed.  We should be surprised and shocked 
if America's military did not.  For nearly 200 
years, the tools and tactics of how we fight have 
evolved with military technologies.  Now, 
fundamental changes are affecting the very 
character of war.113
The “fundamental changes” cited by Cebrowski and 
Garstka are a result of our entering into the Information 
Age.  “Recent advances in information technologies and the 
ability of organizations and individuals to take advantage 
of the opportunities these advances provide are profoundly 
altering the nature of the world in which we live.”114  The 
Information Age is: 
1)  Changing how wealth is created; 
2)  Altering the distribution of power; 
3)  Increasing the complexity; 
4)  Shrinking distances around the world; and 
5)  Compressing time, which increases the tempo of 
our lives.115
Network-centric operations were adapted by the U.S. 
military by examining smart practices implemented by 
business organizations in response to the transition from 
the Industrial Age to the Information Age.  The adaptation 
of these principles to the art of war led to the 
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implementation of network-centric warfare as the military’s 
response to the Information Age.  NCW and all of its 
associated revolutions in military affairs grow out of and 
draw their power from the fundamental changes in American 
society in response to the Information Age.116  These 
changes have been dominated by the co-evolution of 
economics, information technology, business processes, 
warfare, and organizations, and they are linked by three 
themes: 
• The shift in focus from the platform (a military 
vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or structure) to the 
network 
• The shift from viewing actors as independent to 
viewing them as part of a continuously adapting 
ecosystem 
• The importance of making strategic choices to 
adapt or even survive in such changing 
ecosystems117 
These themes have changed the nature of American 
business today, and they also have changed, and will 
continue to change, the way we conduct military operations 
in peace and war.118  A subsequent adaptation of network-
centric principles, tenants, and technology to response 
operations could lead to the transformational change 
required to overcome current deficiencies. 
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C. TENANTS AND PRINCIPALS 
 
“The network-centric approach to warfare is the 
military embodiment of Information Age concepts.  Studies 
have shown that networking enables forces to undertake a 
different range of missions than non-networked forces, by 
improving both efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations.”119  “NCW involves collaboration and sharing of 
information to ensure that all appropriate assets can be 
quickly brought to bear by commanders during combat 
operations.  Procurement policy to support NCW is intended 
to improve economic efficiency by eliminating stove-pipe 
systems, parochial interests, redundant and non-
interoperable systems, and by optimizing capital planning 
investments for present and future information technology 
systems.”120
However, technology is only one of the underpinnings 
of NCW that requires changes in behavior, process, and 
organization to convert the advances of Information Age 
capabilities into combat power.121  “Through new uses of NCW 
technologies, rigid constructs are transformed into dynamic 
constructs that can provide new and advantageous 
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1. Tenants of Network-Centric Warfare 
“Four basic tenets of NCW and a set of governing 
principles for a network-centric force have been 
identified.  Together, these tenets and principles comprise 
the core of NCW as an emerging theory of war in the 
Information Age.  The four tenets of NCW help us understand 
the enhanced power of networked forces.”123  At the same 
time, they constitute a working hypothesis about NCW as a 
source of warfighting advantage: 
• A robustly networked force improves information 
sharing 
• Information sharing enhances the quality of 
information and shared situational awareness 
• Shared situational awareness enables 
collaboration  and self-synchronization, and 
enhances sustainability  and speed of command 
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission 
effectiveness124 
 
2. Principles of Network-Centric Warfare 
The four tenants of NCW are supported by nine 
governing principles: 
• Fight first for information superiority 
• Access to information (leading to shared 
awareness) 
• Speed of command and decision making 
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• Self-synchronization 
• Dispersed forces (non-contiguous operations) 
• Demassification 
• Deep sensor reach 
• Alter initial conditions at higher rates of 
change 
• Compressed operations and levels of war125 
The fight for information superiority is an attempt to 
generate an information advantage through better 
timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of information.126
Shared awareness, developed from access to 
information, is the ability to routinely translate 
information and knowledge into the requisite level of 
common understanding and situational awareness across the 
spectrum of participants in joint (multi-service) and 
combined (multi-national) operations.127
Speed of command and decision making allows our forces 
to recognize an information advantage and convert it into a 
competitive advantage by compressing decision timelines to 
produce decision superiority and decisive effects.128
Self-Synchronization increases the opportunity for 
low-level forces to operate nearly autonomously and to re-
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task themselves through exploitation of shared awareness 
and the commander’s intent.129
Dispersed forces allow commanders to move combat power 
from the linear battlespace to non-contiguous operations 
through rapid “swarming” of forces when and where they are 
required.130  This swarming effect can be initiated 
autonomously by individual units through increased 
situational awareness, self-synchronization, and initiative 
or orchestrated by upper levels of command through rapid 
unit identification and synergistic re-tasking in real 
time. 
Demassification is the movement from an approach based 
on geographically contiguous massing of forces to one based 
upon achieving effects.131
Deep Sensor Reach leverages the expanded use of 
deployable, distributed, and networked sensors, both 
distant and proximate, that detect actionable information 
on items of interest at operationally relevant ranges to 
achieve decisive effects.132
Altering initial conditions at higher rates of change 
allows our military to exploit the principles of high-
quality shared awareness, dynamic self-synchronization, 
dispersed and de-massed forces, deep sensor reach, 
compressed operations and levels of war, and rapid speed of 
command to enable the joint force to swiftly identify, 
adapt to, and change an opponent’s operating context to our 
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advantage.133  “Warfare is highly path-dependent; hence, the 
imperative to control the initial conditions.  The close 
coupling in time of critical events has been shown 
historically to have profound impact both psychologically 
and in locking out potential responses by the enemy.”134
Compressed operations and levels of war eliminate 
procedural boundaries between Services and within processes 
so that joint operations are conducted at the lowest 
organizational levels possible to achieve rapid and 
decisive effects.135
“While it is not suggested that the governing 
principles for a network-centric force have supplanted or 
are going to replace the time-tested principles of war that 
include mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of 
force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, [and] 
simplicity; they provide added direction for executing 
military operations in the Information Age.”136
 
D. INFORMATION AGE DOMAINS OF CONFLICT  
 
The four domains of conflict; physical, information, 
cognitive, and social, as well as the intersections between 
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the implementation and evolution of network-centric warfare 
to allow our military forces to further increase their 
mission effectiveness.137
The physical domain is the traditional domain of 
warfare where forces are employed in time and space.  This 
domain of conflict includes land, sea, air, and space 
environments where the range of military operations are 
executed and where the physical forces, platforms, and 
communications networks that connect them reside.138
The information domain is the domain where information 
is created, manipulated, and shared.  It is the domain that 
facilitates the communication of information among 
warfighters.  This is the domain of sensors and the 
processes for sharing and accessing sensor products as well 
where information is given value to produce intelligence.  
It is where command and control of military forces is 
communicated and the commander’s intent is conveyed.139
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“The information that exists in the information domain 
may or may not truly reflect ground truth.  For example, a 
sensor observes the real world and produces an output 
(data) which exists in the information domain.”140  “With 
the exception of direct sensory observation, all of our 
information about the world comes through and is affected 
by our interaction with the information domain.  And it is 
through the information domain that we communicate with 
others.”141
The cognitive domain is in the minds of the 
participants.  This is the place where perceptions, 
awareness, understanding, beliefs, and values reside and 
where, as a result of sensemaking, decisions are made.  The 
intangibles of leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of 
training and experience, situational awareness, and public 
opinion are elements of this domain.142  This is the domain 
where commander’s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures reside.  This is also where decisive 
battlespace concepts and tactics emerge.143
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All of the contents of the cognitive domain pass 
through a filter or lens we have labeled human 
perception.  This filter consists of the 
individual’s worldview, the body of personal 
knowledge the person brings to the situation, 
their experience, training, values, and 
individual capabilities (intelligence, personal 
style, perceptual capabilities, etc.).  Since 
these human perceptual lenses are unique to each 
individual, we know that individual cognition 
(understandings, etc.) are also unique.  There is 
one reality, or physical domain.  This is 
converted into selected data, information, and 
knowledge by the systems in the information 
domain.  By training and shared experience we try 
to make the cognitive activities of military 
decision makers similar, but they nevertheless 
remain unique to each individual.144
The social domain is where humans interact, exchange 
information, form shared awareness and understandings, and 
make collaborative decisions.  This is also the domain of 
culture, the set of values, attitudes, and beliefs held and 
conveyed by leaders to the society, whether military or 
civil.145  It overlaps but is distinct from the other 
domains of information age conflict.  Cognitive activities 
by their nature are individualistic; they occur in the 
minds of individuals.  “However, shared sensemaking, the 
process of going from shared awareness to shared 
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cognitive activity because the individual’s cognitive 
activities are directly impacted by the social nature of 
the exchange and vice versa.”146
The intersection of the Information Age Domains of 
Conflict is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   Information Age Domains of Conflict (From The 
Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare) 
 
The precision force is created at the intersection of 
the information and physical domains.  Shared awareness and 
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tactical innovation occur at the intersection between the 
information and cognitive domains.  The intersection 
between the physical and cognitive domains is where 
compressed operations occur and where high rates of change 
are developed.  NCW, the military’s response to the 
challenges and opportunities of the Information Age, exists 
where all four domains intersect.147
 
E. COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
 
The network-centric catalyst to improve information 
sharing, shared situational awareness, and self-
synchronization to enable effective collaboration is the 
Common Operational Picture (COP).  The “picture” provided 
by the COP is more than a graphic display of the current 
situation; it is a conceptual understanding or 
interpretation of the collective information that exists on 
the network. 
Examples of information concerning friendly, enemy, 
and neutral forces that can be integrated in a COP include: 
1)  Location (current positions, rate of movement, 
and predicted future positions); 
2) Status (readiness postures including combat 
capability, whether or not in contact, logistics 





147  Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, 1-75. 
64 
                    
3)  Available courses of action and predicted actions 
for enemy forces (force information also includes 
the  capabilities of offensive and defensive 
enemy weapons  systems and damage assessment as a 
result of friendly actions); and 
4)  The environment (including current and predicted 
weather conditions, the predicted effect of 
weather on planned operations and enemy options, 
and terrain features such as trafficability, 
canopy, sight lines, and sea conditions).148
A COP includes both “geospatial displays of the 
battlespace and internal intranets that extend vertically 
through multiple layers of command and serves as a 
commonly-accessible repository of information for military 
decision makers.  The development of the current generation 
COP was motivated largely by the desire to improve 
situation awareness within a military command structure, 
thus leading to faster and better synchronized planning and 
execution decisions.”149  Evidence of success in this area 
is demonstrated by examples of operational and tactical 
decision making being displayed by networked military 
forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as compared with 
decision making just 12 years previously in Operation 
DESERT STORM.  Examples include the methodical and 
efficient destruction of elite Iraqi army divisions, the 
quick-responsive and precision attack of high-value targets 
by theater-level air and cruise missile assets, and the 
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speed with which coalition forces move from Kuwait to the 
Iraqi capital of Baghdad.150  The next generation COP is 
being built upon a clear understanding of the 
sociocognitive processes employed within a military command 
organization to translate available information into timely 
and focused action.151  These processes are variously 
identified in the research literature as information 
management, sensemaking, and decision making.152
 
1. Information Management 
The COP attempts to mitigate several information 
management factors that impede the transformation of 
information into knowledge: 
• Lacking sufficient information or lacking 
confidence in the available information to 
adequately make sense of a situation (situation 
uncertainty); 
• Being overwhelmed with too much irrelevant 
information that prevents focusing on the 
important elements of a situation (information 
glut); 
• Lacking an appropriate, experience-based problem 
framework for interpreting the available 
information and associating it with action 
responses (situation ambiguity); 
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• Having multiple, competing problem frameworks for 
interpreting the available information 
(explanatory equivocality); and 
• Having an experience-based problem framework that 
yields only limited insight into an evolving or 
emergent situation (situation emergence)153 
 
2. Sensemaking 
A modern battlefield is a fluid, dynamic environment 
in which outcomes and enemy reactions cannot always be 
predicted with great accuracy.   
Battlespace conditions change, adversary 
intentions and strategy are not always fully 
understood, and the fog and friction of war 
combine to produce both situational novelty and 
ambiguity.  As noted in recent military 
operations, emergent threats and opportunities 
can often reflect a mixture of military, 
political, and diplomatic issues.  As a result, 
when a command organization begins to compare 
reports and indications of actual events within 
the battlespace to the prior held set of 
expectations, discontinuities emerge and give 
rise to the need for sensemaking.154   
Sensemaking refers to the sociocognitive activities 
undertaken by an individual or organization when it is 
faced with novelty or operational situations that do not 
conform to prior expectations.155  “Sensemaking can be both 
a belief-driven process and an action-driven process.  It 
is a belief-driven process in the sense that the 
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interpretation of current events is based on the past 
experience and accumulated expertise of the commander and 
his battle staff.”156  This interpretation is also shaped by 
the context of assigned mission goals and objectives as 
well as the prior decisions and commitments that have 
already been made by the commander independent of context.  
“It is an action-driven process in the sense that 
organizations often take actions to shape their operating 
environment and then later attach meaning to these actions 
to provide them with significance.  Both processes operate 
simultaneously, and as a continuous stream of mental 
activities, as the commander and staff attempt to impose a 
mental framework on the chaos of the battlespace, a 
framework that both simplifies and systematizes their 
thinking about the unfolding operations.”157  The COP, as 
employed in a network-centric framework, attempts to answer 
key questions while resolving ambiguities, often by 
arranging known facts and held beliefs in story form.  “In 
fact, storytelling has become a commonly recognized method 
for communicating visions, strategies, structures, 
identities, goals, and values within both organizations and 
cultures.  Stories also represent a powerful mechanism for 
communicating themes and evoking visual images.”158  Results 
of experiments dealing with information and limited time 
show that color graphic presentations, as represented in a 
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COP, were advantageous to actors and decision makers who 
operated under high time constraints.159
There has been additional recognition of the benefit 
of accommodating storytelling features in the design of 
computer-supported cooperative work systems, such as a COP.  
Situational awareness is deemed a major causal factor for 
improved combat effectiveness for the warfighter involved 
in network-centric operations.160  Researchers have 
demonstrated through controlled experimentation that use of 
a relatively complete COP by members of a warfighting team 
results in improved situational awareness, and that this 
situational awareness is further improved in proportion to 
the amount of time the warfighting team spends in 
collaboration using the COP.161
 
3. Decision Making 
The final function to be supported by the COP is that 
of decision making.  In one sense, decision making cannot 
be separated from the activities of information management 
and sensemaking.162  It is also noted that different 
approaches to decision making can arise under varying 
circumstances of situational ambiguity and time stress.  
Three primary modes of decision making that are typically 
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observed within a military command organization are 
deliberate decision making, recognition-primed decision 
making, and incremental decision making.163
“Deliberate decision making embodies the traditional 
military decision making process in which the staff engages 
in the systematic identification, analysis, and assessment 
of several course of action responses to an adversary.  
This process is characterized by a formally communicated 
commander’s assessment, the systematic wargaming of 
alternative courses of action (for both friendly and 
adversary forces), and the identification of a preferred 
course of action that balances expected outcome against 
risks and resource costs.”164  “Deliberate decision making 
is engaged in when time stress is relatively low (e.g., 
pre-hostilities phase of an operation), where the 
operational situation is understood with some degree of 
clarity, and where the problem framework is relatively 
defined in terms of objectives, key variables, and 
constraints.”165
Recognition-primed decision making, also referred to 
in research literature as “naturalistic decision making”, 
is a mode of decision making preferred by experts in high 
time stress environments that involve substantial time 
pressure.166  Recognition-primed decision making occurs when 
an individual or organization recognizes the type of 
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situation at hand and, from previous experience or mental 
model, selects the appropriate course of action.167  “As 
compared with deliberate decision making, recognition-
primed decision making offers the advantage of being both 
(1) action-oriented (the decision maker always has response 
options available for execution) and (2) rapid (minimal 
time is consumed between recognition and response).  The 
recognition-primed model also conforms to the personality 
of many military leaders since it provides them the 
opportunity to remain actively involved in the operational 
situation and requires minimal contemplative thought.”168
Studies of the effects of time pressure and 
completeness of information on decision making conclude 
that, in addition to information management and 
sensemaking, time and experience play a significant factor 
in decisions: 
• In general, complete information improves 
performance 
• Time pressure usually, but not always, impairs 
performance 
• The more experienced the individual, the less 
affected they were by time pressure and more 
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• Less experienced individuals tend to make more 
decisions within a given time interval than 
experienced commanders who quickly set and follow 
a strategic plan and modify it to the dynamic 
environment169 
“There is a danger, however, in assuming that all 
military decision making can be characterized by [the 
recognition-primed decision] model.  There is growing 
evidence that organizations cannot simply employ a 
naturalistic decision making process in the same way as 
individuals.”170   
Individuals make sense of the world largely 
through the use of internal mental models.  This 
natural human process largely reflects the 
recognition-primed model just discussed.  When 
functioning in this manner, there is often little 
or no need for the individual to ‘externalize’ 
their knowledge and communicate it with others.  
In fact, most individuals would find this task to 
be extremely difficult since much of their 
expertise exists subconsciously in the form of 
intuition or tacit (hidden) knowledge.  However, 
such is not the case in an organization where 
decisions and actions must be synchronized across 
participants toward a common goal and common 
understanding of the operational environment, a 
fact that is beginning to be recognized in some 
military quarters.  In order for such 
synchronization to take place, individuals must 
‘externalize’ what they know and understand to 
the degree that it can be shared and reconciled 
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reconciling knowledge is exactly what makes 
cohesive sensemaking difficult to achieve at the 
organizational level.”171
Advantages of recognition-primed decision making must 
be balanced against its limitations.  This is particularly 
true in joint operations where the degree of situational 
ambiguity is high and various parts of the command 
organization see the operational situation from different 
perspectives.172  The need to cope with situational 
ambiguity gives rise to the third mode of decision making, 
incremental decision making.  “This mode is defined as a 
process by which a command organization directs its forces 
to take incremental steps to contain an adversary’s 
operational advantages while continuing to clarify the 
overall operational situation.  The notion of incremental 
decision making is consistent with current research 
literature on organizational sensemaking inasmuch as it 
acknowledges the need to combine mental analysis with 
action-taking in order to develop an understanding of the 
operational situation while, at the same time, shape the 
operational situation to conform with expectations and 
desired objectives.”173  This model of decision making is 
also consistent with research on corporate strategies for 
dealing with ambiguity and is applicable in both military 
and response operations.174
“At any given time, a command organization is likely 
to be engaged in all three modes of decision making, 
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depending upon the nature of the emerging threats and 
opportunities.  Thus, it is important that the next 
generation COP provide effective support for each of these 
decision making modes.”175
“Shared battlespace awareness emerges when all 
relevant elements of the warfighting ecosystem are provided 
with access to the COP.  This means that battlespace 
awareness must be viewed as a collective property (a type 
of collective consciousness).”176  Shared situational 
awareness does not exist at just one place on the network 
or in the battlespace, but rather at all relevant nodes in 
the battlespace, across echelons and functional 
components.177
 
F. NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The network-centric operations conceptual framework 
was developed jointly over several years by NCW pioneers 
Cebrowski and Garstka, the DoD’s Office of Force 
Transformation, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.178  The 
purpose of developing the network-centric operations 
conceptual framework was to develop a set of metrics to 
assess the tenets of NCW.  “In order to develop metrics for 
the tenets, it is first necessary to identify a top level 
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or concept level representation of network-centric 
operations concepts and their relations.”179  While it 
provides a means to evaluate hypotheses about network-
centric operations, it also clarifies and illuminates 
important aspects of network-centric operational theory 
that were only implicit in the original tenets.180
Figure 2 illustrates a simplified top level view of 
the network-centric operations conceptual framework and 
highlights the essential elements of the network-centric 
















179  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 57. 
180  Ibid. 





Figure 2.   Simplified Top-Level View of the Network-Centric 
Operations Conceptual Framework (After Network-Centric 
Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
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However, in order to develop metrics, further 
development was made.182  Figure 3 illustrates the concept 
level view of the network-centric operations conceptual 
framework for assessment.  The complexity of this view 
reflects the fact that it is a guide for experimentation 
and research, and thus, necessarily includes a great deal 
of detail.183  In Chapter IV, the network-centric operations 
conceptual framework will be applied to response operations 
and its outputs will be mapped to measures of effectiveness 
(outcomes) that lead to accomplishment of the four basic 
tasks to operate in the information age (goals). 
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Figure 3.   The Network-Centric Operations Conceptual 




                    
The Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework: 
• Builds on the tenets of NCW; 
• Is best understood as a generic “process model”; 
• Explicitly recognizes the key role of the “social 
domain”; 
• Incorporates important research on “sensemaking”; 
• Identifies key concepts important in most 
workflow processes; 
• Identifies potential dependencies among concepts; 
• Identifies and defines attributes and metrics for 
each concept; 
• Is scalable across different levels of 
aggregation;  
• Provides a basis for quantitative exploration 
and/or assessment of network-centric hypotheses; 
and investment strategies184 
Network-centric operations are not about technical 
hardware and routers; they are about people, organizations, 
and processes.  The conceptual framework highlights the 
fact that network-centric operations cut across several 
domains:  physical, information, cognitive, and social.  
The central role of social interactions, including 
collaboration, is evident in the conceptual framework.185  
“…The framework also distinguishes between individuals and 
groups (teams, organizations, etc.).  This is an especially 
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important innovation as future operations are expected to 
be joint and involve interagency coordination and 
international partners.”186
Development of the conceptual framework also led to 
the emergence of agility as an especially important concept 
for network-centric operations which captures the essence 
of transformation.187  “Agility refers to the ability to be 
robust, flexible, responsive, innovative, resilient, and 
adaptive.”188
The military continues to evolve its NCW capabilities 
in pursuit of increased degrees of information sharing 
leading to an increased benefit from improved information 
sharing.  The current state of NCW evolution and future 
roadmap are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   Evolution of Network-Centric Warfare (After 
Network-Centric Operations: The Power of Information 
Age Concepts and Technologies) 
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G. BENEFITS OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
 
NCW is more about networking than networks.  It 
is about the increased combat power that can be 
generated by a network-centric force.  The power 
of NCW is derived from the effective linking or 
networking of knowledgeable entities that are 
geographically or hierarchically dispersed.  The 
networking of knowledgeable entities enables them 
to share information and collaborate to develop 
shared awareness, and also to collaborate with 
one another to achieve a degree of self-
synchronization.  The net result is increased 
combat power.189
“Emerging literature supports the theory that power is 
increasingly derived from information sharing, information 
access, and speed.  This view has been supported by results 
of recent military operational experiences showing that 
when forces are truly joint, with comprehensively 
integrated capabilities and operating according to the 
principles of NCW, they can fully exploit the highly path-
dependent nature of information age warfare.”190
“Evidence accumulated from a wide range of U.S. 
military activities, including combat operations, training 
events, exercises, and demonstrations, has strongly 
supported the validity of NCW as an emerging theory of war 
and illustrated the power of networked forces.  In general, 
the outcomes have consistently been decisive in favor of 
forces that are robustly networked.”191
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Networked forces can fight using new tactics.  During 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S. and other coalition forces 
utilized movement that was described by some as “swarm 
tactics.”   
Because networking allows soldiers to keep track 
of each other when they are out of one another’s 
sight, forces could move forward in Iraq spread 
out in smaller independent units, avoiding the 
need to maintain a tight formation.  Using “swarm 
tactics,” unit movements are conducted quickly, 
without securing the rear.  All units know each 
other’s location.  If one unit gets into trouble, 
other independent units nearby can quickly come 
to their aid, “swarming” to attack the enemy from 
all directions at once.192
The concept of “swarm intelligence” is currently being 
applied to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).  Software 
programs modeled after swarms of living organisms that 
often self-organize into highly complex systems that 
consist of the interaction of many simple individuals 
(e.g., flocks of birds, schools of fish, and swarms of 
insects) are being used to task the next generation of 
smart UAS.193  “In this initial research, [UAS] are 
controlled through local rules, but attempt to achieve a 
common goal as a swarm. Control strategies are based on 
strictly local information, and other strategies that 
involve varying degrees of global coordination. The 
simulator was then extended to allow [UAS] to track moving 
targets, strike targets, and perform battle damage 
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assessment.”194  Initial experiments with UAS operating 
using swarm intelligence programs may benefit other sensor 
and C2 problems by adopting similar decentralized 
approaches to military command and control in network-
centric environments.195   
Networked forces can consist of smaller-size units 
that can travel lighter and faster, meaning fewer troops 
with fewer platforms and carrying fewer supplies can 
perform a mission effectively, or differently, at a lower 
cost.196   
In some tactical engagements, superior platforms 
were decisively defeated by less capable 
platforms that were able to leverage order-of-
magnitude improvements in information sharing 
enabled by networking.  In other engagements, 
digitized and networked ground forces with a 
reduced number of platforms were able to 
substitute information for mass and outperform 
units equipped with a larger number of platforms 
not similarly digitized and networked.  Even more 
impressively, the combination of networked and 
digitized ground and air forces was able to 
decisively defeat an opposition force with 
unprecedented lethality by creating and 
leveraging an information advantage.197
The way individual soldiers think and act on the 
battlefield is also changing.  When a unit encounters a 
difficult problem in the field, they radio the Tactical 
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Operations Center, which types the problem into an online 
chat room using Microsoft Chat software.  The problem is 
then swarmed by experts who may be located as far away as 
the Pentagon.198
The sensor-to-shooter time is reduced.  Using NCW 
systems, soldiers in the field have the capability to 
conduct an on site analysis of raw intelligence from sensor 
displays rather than waiting for analysis reports to arrive 
back from the continental United States.199
 
H. DRAWBACKS TO NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
 
In theory, NCW will result in the development of a 
single network but its current state is one of an evolving 
"network of networks" with all the problems of integration 
that usually result from such schemes. 
The NCW principle of information superiority does not 
necessarily equate to large quantities of information 
and/or data, yet some organizations become focused strictly 
on data collection without regard to relevance or quality.  
Ultimately more information is not necessarily what is 
needed, rather it is a better understanding of the 
information we already have.200  Additionally, some 
commanders believe that more information imposes a higher 
degree of accountability on actions.  Failure to minimize 
casualties or protect civilians may be digitally reviewed 
and used to politicize flawed military decisions.  This 
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could lead to an unnatural reluctance or compulsion to act 
or to reserve decisions for higher levels of command.201
“The early products of NCW are encouraging a dangerous 
trend toward centralized control and execution.  If this 
continues, we will create an organization that has a 
diminished ability to develop the leadership skills of its 
junior officer and enlisted personnel and discourages any 
independent action and stifles innovation.”202  This trend 
is in direct opposition to the last principle of network-
centric warfare, utilization of compressed operations and 
levels of war to conducted operations at the lowest 
organizational levels possible. 
While NCW benefits the total force, higher echelons of 
command may forgo the essential human networking in favor 
of the increased capability to mange the battle remotely, 
down to the lowest tactical levels possible.  “The threat 
lies not within the core concepts of NCW, which propose 
universal connectivity and information distribution, but 
with the possibility that NCW is morphing from a force-
multiplier into a technological warfare management 
system.”203  A commander who covets the information 
superiority that he derives from NCW is likely to focus 
solely on technical improvements that lead to a greater 
ability to direct force actions though strict permissive 
and restrictive orders being issued to dispersed forces 
rather than encouraging initiative through strategic  
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guidance and commander’s intent.  If NCW tenants and 
principles are perverted or ignored, access to information 
by micro-managing command elements can be an enslaving 
rather than liberating force.  In this case, “NCW is likely 
to become technology-centered and driven, resulting in the 
focus being more on the network than on the networking.  
Despite the rhetoric, the human dimension in warfare is 
more likely to be ignored at the expense of the network.”204
As the technical implementation goes forward there is 
the potential for decision makers to forget the human side 
of NCW theory.  In theory, NCW should continue with 
existing trends towards decentralized command and control.  
In reality it could easily result in far greater 
centralization of command at both political and military 
levels.205
“The six months of major combat in Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM in Afghanistan saw not only centralized planning, 
but also a degree of centralized execution that was unique 
in the U.S. experience.  Greatly expanded global 
communications connectivity provided unprecedented real-
time situational awareness at all levels. 
That new capability allowed sensor-to-shooter links to 
be shortened, in some cases, from hours to minutes.  It 
also, however, resulted in an oversubscribed target-
approval process that lengthened, rather than compressed, 
the kill chain.  As a result, the human factor became the 
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main constraint impeding more effective time-critical 
targeting.”206  Examples include the use of new Global 
Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions such as the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). Previous generations of air-
to-ground weapons were guided directly by the aircrew who 
either selected a weapon impact point using their system or 
guided the weapon to the target using a laser, data link or 
some other method.  GPS-guided munitions fly to a set of 
three-dimensional coordinates which are often supplied 
prior to flight or during the mission by an outside entity.  
This has relegated aircrew to the role of an ordnance “dump 
truck” who are reliant upon others for weapon accuracy and 
targeting.  
In one engagement in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, an  
F-14 Tomcat aircrew had expended all of its weapons while 
engaging a Taliban convoy that was traveling east of Masir-
e-Sharif, leaving several additional vehicles abandoned but 
undamaged.207  The aircrew requested additional aircraft 
from the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) via the E-3 
AWACs to complete the destruction of the convoy.  A single 
B-52 was sent to the location that was carrying CBU-103 
Wind-corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), GPS-guided 
cluster munitions that fly to a set of three-dimensional 
coordinates and release a pattern of cluster weapons that 
are effective against vehicles.  The F-14 was equipped with 
a laser designator pod that had been modified to generate 
precise coordinates for GPS-guided munitions.  Despite the 
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insistence by the F-14 crew that the convoy was in a remote 
location with no possibility of collateral damage and that 
they could provide precise targeting coordinates directly 
to the B-52 crew, they were required to read the 
coordinates of each vehicle to be destroyed through the 
AWACs to the CAOC.  The CAOC staff then validated the 
coordinates and read them back to the AWACs crew, who then 
relayed them to the B-52 before weapons were allowed to be 
employed.  This process took over 20 minutes to destroy 
stationary vehicles that could have been destroyed in much 
less than half of the time due to over-involvement in the 
tactical targeting approval process by command elements.  
Although NCW should result in making relatively small 
military forces far more capable, it may result in even 
smaller forces than we have now as budget planners seek to 
maintain the current level of mission effectiveness with 
fewer forces.  So while the theory should allow for greater 
effectiveness, it could be used as a means of gaining 
greater efficiencies.208
While some force reduction may be acceptable, forces 
cannot be reduced below a certain threshold level without 
adverse effects.  “Applying the principle that networked 
forces can adequately do the job previously undertaken by 
numerically superior forces goes against our acceptance of 
the ‘three block war’ concept.”209  As former U.S. Marine 
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In one moment in time, our service members will 
be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - 
providing humanitarian assistance.  In the next 
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes 
apart – conducting peacekeeping operations.  
Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal 
mid-intensity battle.  All on the same day, all 
within three city blocks.  It will be what we 
call the three block war.210   
Significant force reductions below a threshold level 
lead to increased force fatigue and inability to 
effectively “swarm” assets due to significant dispersion in 
the battlefield or simply the unavailability of forces to 
quickly assemble and achieve decisive results.   
NCW should result in larger numbers of smaller, less 
complex and less costly platforms/systems operating as 
nodes in a wider network, but it could result in a smaller 
number of more complex and more expensive platforms and 
systems.  This would be counter to the NCW principle of 
demassification.  A smaller number of expensive, critical 
nodes would render the network more vulnerable to attack 
and less resilient to damage.211  U.S. Military force 
structure has traditionally favored technological 
superiority over superiority of numbers.  We sacrifice 
ship, aircraft, vehicle, and troop numbers to technology 
even as we decry the resulting stress on operational tempo 
and global presence (e.g., B-2 and F-22).212  “Because we 
are far more likely to encounter targets of influence 
 
210  Borgu, The Challenges and Limitations of Network Centric 
Warfare–The Initial Views of an NCW Sceptic, 7. 
211  Ibid., 2-4. 
212  Thomas Barnett, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric 





                    
operating in the ‘few and cheap’ paradigm, what we should 
bring to the table are ‘the many’ as opposed to ‘the 
costly’."213  “The few-and-costly approach puts us in no-win 
situations, where our entry into crises is self-limited by 
our tendency, and our opponent's knowledge of that 
tendency, to treat the loss of any significant network node 
as grounds for one of two equally bad pathways: escalation 
or withdrawal.”214   
As Admiral Cebrowski stated regarding the 
implementation of NCW, it is important to “get the theory 
right”.215  Network-centric operations are not a panacea for 
deficiencies in warfare or response operations, if adapted 
to the area of response.  Most drawbacks to the employment 
of network-centric operations originate from deviations 
from the tenants and principles through improper or 
incomplete implementation.  Transformation will not be 
achieved by the implementation of new technology alone, but 
must include initiatives in all four Information Age 
domains of conflict and adherence to the underlying 
principles of network-centric operations. 
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS TO 
RESPONSE 
While we have built a response system that ably 
handles the demands of a typical hurricane 
season, wildfires, and other limited natural and 
man-made disasters, the system clearly has 
structural flaws for addressing catastrophic 
events.216
While we remain faithful to time tested 
principles, we must likewise accept that events 
such as Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, require us to 
tailor the application of these principles to the 
threats we confront in the 21st Century.217
 
Having documented current deficiencies in response 
operations and conducted an examination of how the military 
has adapted network-centric operations from the business 
world and effectively applied its tenants and principles to 
the conduct of warfare, it is essential to establish the 
applicability and benefit of network-centric operations 
tenants, principles, and technology to response operations.  
The resulting approach to response operations would be 
correctly labeled as network-centric response. 
 
A. THE PATH TO TRANSFORMATION 
 
Failures in the ability to effectively respond to the 
attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina can ultimately be 
attributed to a lack of network centricity in response 
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infrastructure, planning, organization and execution which 
resulted in an inability to complete the four basic tasks 
required to address Information Age challenges.218  Since 
the attacks of 9/11, numerous government documents have 
outlined goals and objectives that emergency respond 
agencies can pursue in an effort to improve response 
mission effectiveness.  Although not explicitly stated, 
many of these goals and objectives mark the path for 
transformation and could be achieved by the implementation 
of network-centric response. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, published 
in 2002, establishes a national vision for the future of 
emergency preparedness and response: 
We will strive to create a fully integrated 
national emergency response system that is 
adaptable enough to deal with any terrorist 
attack, no matter how unlikely or catastrophic, 
as well as all manner of natural disasters.  
Under the President’s proposal, the Department of 
Homeland Security will consolidate federal 
response plans and build a national system for 
incident management. The Department would aim to 
ensure that leaders at all levels of government 
have complete incident awareness and can 
communicate with and command all appropriate 
response personnel.  Our Federal, State, and 
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local governments would ensure that all response 
personnel and organizations; including the law 
enforcement, military, emergency response, health 
care, public works, and environmental 
communities, are properly equipped, trained, and 
exercised to respond to all terrorist threats and 
attacks in the United States.219
The 2003 Statewide Template Initiative includes 
several guiding principles to assist State, local, and 
tribal authorities in their development of coordinated and 
comprehensive homeland security plans.  Among these 
principles is the recognition that “our enemy is networked 
and can only be defeated by a networked system therefore 
homeland defense must resemble networked PCs rather than a 
mainframe computer.”220  In addition to the explicit 
direction to bring network centricity to homeland security 
operations including response operations, there are several 
other principles that imply an adaptation of network-
centric response in the Statewide Template Initiative.  
These principles include promoting interoperable and 
reliable telecommunications capabilities nationwide; 
promoting integrated and collective training, exercises and 
evaluations (collaboration); facilitating the adoption of 
best practices from other jurisdictions (information 
sharing); and assuring that efforts are State based but 
locally focused and driven—flexible, scalable, and 
adaptable (collaboration and self-synchronization).221
The National Preparedness Guidance, released by DHS in 
2005, lists capability-specific priorities that include 
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network-centric enabling goals.  These goals are to 
strengthen information sharing and collaboration 
capabilities and to strengthen interoperable communications 
capabilities.222  “Information sharing and collaboration 
capabilities are necessary tools to enable efficient 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities. 
Information sharing is the multi-jurisdictional, 
multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information 
and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and 
tribal levels of government, the private sector, and 
citizens.”223  The ability to effectively share information 
is a prerequisite for collaboration among interagency 
partners.  “Collaboration encompasses a wide range of 
activities aimed at coordinating the capabilities and 
resources possessed by various governmental and private 
sector entities.  While Information Sharing seeks to foster 
a willingness and ability to provide information and/or 
intelligence, collaboration represents the establishment of 
formal relationships among various and disparate homeland 
security entities and systems to interact and cooperate.”224
A final example of a trail marker on the path to 
transformation is the Interoperability Continuum developed 
by the SAFECOM program.  The 2006 National Interoperability 
Baseline Survey represents the first comprehensive effort 
to survey public safety first responder agencies across law 
enforcement, fire response, and emergency medical services 
disciplines in all 50 states and the District of 
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Columbia.225  In contrast to other studies on 
interoperability conducted over the past ten years, this 
study assessed five critical elements of governance; 
policies, practices, and procedures; technology; training 
and exercises; and usage, to determine an organization’s 
capacity for interoperability.226  The Interoperability 
Continuum is contained in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.   SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum (From the 2006 
National Interoperability Baseline Survey) 
 
The level of interoperability that is desired to 
support network-centric response operations lies on the far 
right of the continuum and encompasses interagency 
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collaboration that is only possible with access to 
information and ability to share information through 
interoperable human and technology-based networks. 
 
B. THE “FOG AND FRICTION” OF RESPONSE 
 
In addition to governmental strategic vision for 
improved response mission effectiveness, the further 
adaptation of network-centric principles from warfare to 
response is facilitated by the similarities between the 
challenges, operating environment, and requirements present 
in military and emergency response operations as summarized 
in Table 2 below. 
 
Challenges Operational Environment Characteristics Requirements 
Time-constrained 
decisions/actions resulting in 
the preservation or loss of life  
Uncertainty 
Ability to effectively 
communicate and share 
information 
Lack of information Dynamic conditions  
Information management and 
exchange to support tailorable, 
dynamic, and timely access to 
information 
Multi-agency "joint" operations 
within a defined area 
Real-time mission planning, 
control, and execution 
Deployable sensors and 
information technology 
Variety in background, training, 
and experience of force 
personnel Geographically distributed 
teams of personnel 
Multi-level command centers 
Coordination and collaboration 
between "joint" partners Diverse operational roles and 
equipment 
Rapid, decentralized decision 
making Individual and shared 
situational awareness 
 





                    
Warfare and response operations are similar in many 
ways.  They both involve decisions and actions that are 
constrained in time and result in the preservation or loss 
of life.  The decision and actions are complicated by 
incomplete information and dynamic environmental 
conditions. 
The general unreliability of all information 
presents a special problem:  all action takes 
place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, …like 
fog.  War is the realm of uncertainty; three 
quarters of the factors on which action in war is 
based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty… The commander must work in a medium 
which his eyes cannot see, which his best 
deductive powers cannot always fathom; and which, 
because of constant changes, he can rarely be 
familiar.227
— Carl von Clausewitz On War 
 
“As a result of this enduring characteristic of war, 
military organizations have, for centuries, been designed 
to accommodate the lack of available information, that is, 
how to deal with the fog of war.  Fog is all about 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty about where everyone is, what 
their capabilities are, and the nature of their intentions.  
Until recently, a commander could not even have a timely 
and accurate picture of his own forces let alone be 
comfortable in his knowledge of where the enemy was and 
what they were up to.”228
This fog is also found in response operations.  There 
may be a great deal of uncertainty as to the origins of a 
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terrorist attack and the potential for follow-on attacks.  
Emergency response operations are frequently plagued by a 
lack of information sharing and confusion over 
responsibilities among policymakers, law enforcement, 
emergency managers, nonprofit organizations, and federal 
agencies.229  Uncertainty can lead to a significant loss of 
life because many threats require a rapid response 
capability and operating on compressed timelines which 
leaves little room for miscues in coordination.230  In 
particular, actions taken in the first hours to identify, 
contain, and treat victims following a chemical or 
biological attack may significantly reduce the scope of 
casualties.231           
“Friction is all about the glitches that occur in 
carrying out plans to synchronize forces or even to 
accomplish the most simple tasks.  Some of this friction 
can be attributed to fog, some to poor communications, and 
some to a lack of shared knowledge.”232   
Network-centric operations attempt to reduce fog 
(uncertainty) and friction through efficient information 
sharing, development of situational awareness, and self-
synchronization leading to collaboration.  While network-
centric operations will not lead to reduced risk, their 
employment allows for improved risk management by 
accurately identifying the hazards and consequences 
associated with risk estimates. 
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The similarity between operational roles of the 
military and first responders extends to supporting 
information environments in their attempt to deal with fog 
and friction and reduce uncertainty.  “According to 
Milligan and Hendler, ‘…commanders, warfighters, and other 
combatants need an information management and exchange 
capability that supports tailorable, dynamic, and timely 
access to all required information to enable real-time 
planning, control, and execution of their missions… .’”233  
First responders who need a way to share information among 
the disparate computing resources of multiple Federal, 
State, and local agencies that may be involved in 
responding to an emergency have similar requirements.  “For 
example, just as the future force warrior will have an 
array of sensors and portable computing devices, first 
responders are increasingly deployed with information 
technologies to improve capabilities and life safety.  
Similarly, there are emergency management centers 
comparable to theater-level command and control centers.  
In between there is coordination between agencies handling 
an emergency similar to joint task force operations, 
experiencing the same needs for security, privacy, and 
just-in-time delivery of the right information to the right 
people.”234
The main causes of “fog and friction” in current 
response operations are the inability to use information to 
make sense of the situation and the inability to 
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effectively communicate with interagency partners.  
“Information contributes to every aspect of homeland 
security and is a vital foundation for the homeland 
security effort.”235  According to the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security: 
Every government official performing every 
homeland security mission depends upon 
information and information technology.  Although 
American information technology is the most 
advanced in the world, our country’s information 
systems have not adequately supported the 
homeland security mission.  Today, there is no 
single agency or computer network that integrates 
all homeland security information nationwide, nor 
is it likely that there ever will be.  Instead, 
much of the information exists in disparate 
databases scattered among Federal, State, and 
local entities.  In many cases, these computer 
systems cannot share information, either 
horizontally (across the same level of 
government) or vertically (between federal, 
state, and local governments).236   
The inability to effectively communicate and share 
information inhibits sensemaking and the development of 
individual and collective situational awareness.  Without 
situational awareness, individual and organizational self-
synchronization and effective collaboration are not 
possible.  These factors result in delayed response 
timelines and inefficient and flawed decision making that 
ultimately leads to reduced mission effectiveness. 
Just as the military tries to give every individual 
assess to information to build situational awareness at all 
levels, “it is often extremely difficult to extend the 
situational awareness that must be extant in the emergency 
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response system to the frontline responders.  For example, 
fire personnel need to know hydrant and standpipe 
locations, as well as utility and building designs and 
hazardous material inventories.  Often, critical 
information is stored in locations or formats (e.g., paper 
records) that prevent them from being readily on hand.”237  
“All of this information must be combined and assessed to 
provide a common operational view for command-and-control.  
Furthermore, as fire and smoke can develop rapidly, and as 
new information becomes available (e.g., structural 
conditions, presence of building occupants, location of 
operational personnel), the common operational view must be 
quickly and continuously updated.”238
First responders are drawn from a wide variety of 
personnel, including police and fire rescue teams; however, 
they may be supported by other professionals such as hazmat 
teams, local utilities, plant and facility operations 
personnel, and other local officials.239  “The number of 
such first responders and associated agencies is very 
large.  Coordination of the broad variety of first 
responders requires considerable effort.”240  However, like 
military units, first responders generally work in 
distributed teams and must make rapid, decentralized  
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decisions.241  “There is a need for the common operational 
picture to be sent to and updated by distributed teams of 
first responders.”242
First responders have diverse operational roles as 
well.  “With respect to response to a fire, first 
responders have highly specialized roles in terms of search 
and rescue, combating the fire with various equipment 
specialists, triage and medical services and evacuation for 
the injured, hazardous materials handling teams, and, in 
certain circumstances, special personnel and equipment for 
sensing and scouting.  The diversity of these roles broadly 
mirrors the specialized roles played by DoD forces.  Beyond 
direct response to an emergency, there are important 
supporting roles for first responders, including crowd 
control, directing information to the public and public 
officials (for example, evacuation information), and 
coordination with utility and infrastructure maintenance 
personnel.”243
Beyond broad conceptual similarities between the 
military and first responders in terms of coordination of 
operational teams and needed situational awareness, there 
are circumstances where direct collaboration between these 
forces is needed.244  The military has already been deployed 
to support relief operations in response to natural 
disasters (e.g., wildfires, hurricanes, and earthquakes) 
and may deploy in response to a terrorist attack in the 
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future.  The primary mission of the United States Northern 
Command is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and 
defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, 
its territories and interests within the assigned area of 
responsibility and, as directed by the President or 
Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil 
authorities including consequence management operations.  
Consequence management, in the military context, refers to 
responding to the effects of a chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear WMD. 
Providing support of civil authorities can be a 
difficult proposition for the military to coordinate with 
Federal, State, and local entities when a disaster occurs.  
Some of the challenges to interoperability between and 
among military and civil responders cited by the SAFECOM 
program include: 
• More than 60,000 public safety agencies with more 
than 2.5 million personnel 
• The involvement of multiple disciplines (e.g., 
Law Enforcement, Fire Response, Emergency Medical 
Services) 
• Multiple tiers of government (e.g., township, 
city, county/parish, State, and Federal) 
• Technology differences (e.g., multiple system 
manufacturers, different communication modes, 




                    
• Operational differences between public safety 
disciplines 
• Differences in rural versus urban mission 
operations245 
Future military forces will have unprecedented access 
to information provided to field commanders enabling 
decisive, decentralized decision making while ensuring 
coordination among diverse units through a common 
operational picture provided by information technologies.246  
“First Responders have similar operational and information 
needs as they must coordinate actions of diverse units 
while providing those units the information needed for 
rapid and decentralized decision making in response to 
rapidly changing conditions.”247
“…It is not surprising that military concepts of 
operation, organizations, doctrine, and training have 
always been preoccupied with reducing the effects and risks 
associated with fog and friction.”248  The implementation of 
network-centric response offers responders a methodology to 
cope with and reduce the fog and friction of response. 
In its report of the events that transformed our 
nation and marked the beginning of a generational war on 
terrorism, the 9/11 Commission understood the wisdom of 
aligning the strengths of a modern networked military with 
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the deficiencies in response.  “If New York and other major 
cities are to be prepared for future terrorist attacks, 
different first responder agencies within each city must be 
fully coordinated, just as different branches of the U.S. 
military are.”249
 
C. APPLYING THE TENANTS AND PRINCIPLES 
 
The concepts of network-centric operations, shifting 
competitive spaces, changing underlying rule sets, and co-
evolution are not mere theory.  They have been applied 
successfully under demanding conditions with encouraging 
results.  Similarly, these concepts are not limited to a 
few optimum circumstances in business or warfare.  The 
crime rate in New York City, for example, was reduced 
dramatically through the application of these concepts.250
The tenants of network-centric warfare have direct 
application to network-centric response operations.  A 
robustly networked force of responders and supporting 
agencies will improve information sharing among and between 
interagency partners.  Information sharing enhances the 
quality of information and shared situational awareness.  
Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and 
self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed 
of command at local, State, regional, and national levels.  
These factors combine in a synergistic nature to 
dramatically increase overall response mission 
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effectiveness.  This synergic effect is depicted by the 




Figure 6.   The Network-Centric Response Value Chain (After 
Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare) 






sses flow across the four domains of conflict and how 
each element contributes to the accomplishment of one of 
the four basic Information Age tasks and ultimately 
contributes to increased mission effectiveness through 
expression of tangible results in the physical domain. 
The principles of network-centric warfare 
ise, be adopted to achieve network-centric response.  
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natural or manmade disaster where initial conditions can be 
chaotic and difficult to interpret is an essential first 
step in preparing an effective response.  In the case of a 
terrorist incident with a potential for follow-on attacks 
that could even target responders, we must assure our 
information access through a well networked and 
interoperable force and protection of our information 
systems, including protection of sensor systems and the 
first wave of responders to arrive on the scene.251  The 
ability to meet initial information demands as quickly as 
possible and to sustain the flow of information decreases 
our own information needs, especially in volume, by 
increasing our ability to exploit all of our collectors.252
The employment of a collaborative network of networks
ated and refreshed with quality intelligence and non-
intelligence data, both raw and processed, enables 
responders to build a shared awareness relevant to their 
needs through efficient access to the data regardless of 
location.253  These “information users” must also become 
“information suppliers,” responsible for posting 
information without delay.254
Speed of command and de
verage information to compress decision timelines to 
produce decision superiority and decisive effects.255  Speed 
of command and decision is essential to effectively address 
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the effects of a disaster that lead to the loss of life and 
property.  Significant delays in decision making allow 
lethal effects (e.g., fires, flooding, radiation, 
biological or toxic chemicals, power losses) to spread and 
impact a larger population.  Rapid assessment of existing 
threats to life and property, leading to containment or 
mitigation of these threats is essential to response 
mission effectiveness. 
Self-synchronizatio
dinate initiative to produce a meaningful increase in 
operational tempo and responsiveness and exploit the 
advantages of a highly trained, professional force of 
responders.256  Additionally, self-synchronization allows 
responders to rapidly adapt to the dynamic nature of 
response operations without waiting for members of the 
unified command to fully comprehend important developments 
and issue agency-specific guidance and commands. 
Dispersed forces allow decision makers at 
vernment to rapidly identify and apply forces when and 
where they are required upon demand.  This principle 
emphasizes functional control vice physical occupation of 
the effected area to generate response operations at the 
proper time and place with the correct capabilities.257  The 
value of dispersed forces is increased with the close 
coupling of intelligence, operations, and logistics to 
rapidly achieve precise effects.258
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Demassification uses information to achieve desired 
effects, limiting the need to mass physical forces within a 
specific geographical location.259  This is critical during 
the initial phase of response where local response forces 
may be limited in size or capability.  Later in response 
operations when additional and supporting agencies are 
activated, demassification provides response mission 
effectiveness with reduced force sizes through effective 
application of assets operating in a collaborative effort 
as opposed to individual agencies pursuing common goals 
independently. 
Deep sensor reach leverages the increasingly 
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
assets that are often allotted to response operations by 
supporting Federal and DoD agencies (e.g. Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, satellites, and mobile command and control units).  
These sensors augment traditional first responder 
capabilities to gain and maintain information fidelity and 
quality.  Deep sensor reach enables every response platform 
to be a sensor, from the individual responder to a 
satellite, and provides access to this information to the 
entire response force through technological and 
organizational networks.260
The military seeks to alter initial conditions at 
higher rates of change to outpace the enemy and keep them 
off balance.  Responders attempt to exploit the principles 
of high-quality shared awareness, dynamic self-
synchronization, dispersed and de-massed forces, deep 
 
259  Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, 1-75. 
260  Ibid. 
110 
                    
sensor reach, compressed operations, and rapid speed of 
command to quickly assess the situation and slow the rate 
of change following a natural disaster of terrorist 
attack.261  Response operations, like warfare, are highly 
path-dependent, so it is essential to control the initial 
conditions.262
Compressed operations increase the convergence in 
speed of deployment, speed of employment, and speed of 
sustainment and eliminate the compartmentalization of 
individual agency processes, decisions, and actions.263  The 
goal of compressed operations is to eliminate structural 
boundaries to merge capabilities at the lowest possible 
organizational levels (i.e., at the State or local level 
which has ultimate responsibility for response 
effectiveness and is supported by regional and Federal 
entities).264
 
D. A COMMON OPERATIONAL RESPONSE PICTURE 
 
“Rescue and safety information is in a category of 
information that is of importance to one or more parties in 
case of an emergency situation.  As of today, almost no 
information in this group is made readily available through 
a common information grid, nor are any common data 
structures or data models established that makes it easy to 
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utilize such information, if it was available.”265  A multi-
agency, open technological information sharing network with 
standardized data structures is critical, even if agencies 
make the organizational changes required to foster an 
information sharing culture.  “Some of this information is 
available to some extent in closed systems belonging to 
police, fire departments, and commercial security 
providers, but in general this information has to be 
gathered for each individual case and on a larger scale.”266  
If this information was standardized and made available 
easily and reliably, it would have the potential of making 
a major contribution to: 
• Safety of rescue personnel 
• Quicker identification of required resources 
• Effective control of escalation/spread 
• Protection of most valued assets 
• Quicker evacuation and rescue 
• Quicker assessment of damage267 
The presence of integrated information resources 
through a COP provides considerable opportunities to 
technologically savvy military operators who are able to 
leverage these sources.268  “Information such as building 
plans, wind conditions, geographic information system 
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terrain data overlaid with utility information, and 
location of first responders can only aid operations.”269
In addition to the benefits to information management, 
sensemaking, and decision making listed in the previous 
chapter that the military derives from a COP, responders 
should build upon the current model to produce a flexible, 
scaleable, adaptable, and resilient Common Operational 
Response Picture (CORP). 
The CORP should be catalyst leading to improved 
mission effectiveness through better information sharing, 
situational awareness, self-synchronization, and speed of 
command at all levels of government and response.  The CORP 
should be an evolutionary improvement of the modern 
military COP and incorporate the best practices of the 
current design with the latest information technology 
initiatives to increase its benefit and usability by 
responders of all experience levels. 
Some recommended improvements include development of 
technologies that facilitate the brokering of available 
information together with the specific needs of different 
information consumers within the unified command at local, 
State, regional, and national command centers.  
Specifically, tools and methods should be developed for 
negotiating the manner in which information is posted to 
the CORP so that it can serve multiple consumers, each with 
different intended uses of the information.270
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In a related manner, the CORP should provide the means 
for “information tagging” so that the original context of 
information posted to the CORP is retained and available to 
multiple users of that information.271  Information tagging 
is thought to be a critical enabler for information 
aggregation and knowledge creation within an organization 
and may also assist with the implementation of “electronic 
tear lines” for information or intelligence that is 
classified in nature to restrict its access to unintended 
users.  Overuse of classified information will limit its 
“share-ability” and should only be used if absolutely 
necessary.  A “need-to-share” instead of a “need-to-know” 
mindset should be adopted by all CORP users. 
The CORP should also include technologies that enable 
the dynamic creation of ad hoc “project teams” or 
communities of interest that respond to the emergence of 
specific operational problems that must be framed, 
addressed, and resolved in an on-going operation.272  Such 
technology might employ agent-based software systems to 
monitor different stakeholder and functional areas and to 
alert participants to the potential requirement for 
collaboration.273  This implies a certain degree of agility 
is required within the CORP to allow for the dynamic entry 
of new participants, the posting and sharing of new forms 
of knowledge, and the support of collaborative problem 
framing and problem solving.274
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Development of technologies that facilitate the 
appropriate filtering, interpretation, and organization of 
information into actionable knowledge that supports goal-
directed actions and decision making should also be 
considered.  “Development of such technologies, however, 
requires a clear understanding of the distinction between 
information and knowledge.  Specifically, such expert tools 
would assist the staff in structuring available 
information, linking it with the decision making focus of 
the commander, and tailoring it in the form of actionable 
knowledge that can lead to swift and decisive 
operations.”275   
Various filters already exist for military COPs that 
could be adapted for response operations (e.g., geographic, 
unit type, and/or unit status filters) to aid decision 
speed and accuracy.  Automated decision tools are also 
available that could indicate mission progress (e.g., areas 
with completed/incomplete damage assessments, supplies 
delivered, SAR status) or predetermined trigger events and 
recommend potential courses of action.  Given the diversity 
of local, State, regional, and Federal response plans, 
computer-assisted cross referencing of response plans could 
quickly identify points of concurrence and conflict for 
members of the unified command when attempting to decide on 
a proper course of action.  All of these applications could 
be combined with data tags and overlaid on a CORP and 
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1. Decision Making in Response  
One of the primary functions of the CORP is to 
facilitate decision making.  Traditional models of military 
command and control have often reflected decision making as 
a activity that is focused in the personage of a 
commander.276  NCW dictates that decisions be made at the 
lowest level possible and encourages initiative through 
self-synchronization and knowledge of the commander’s 
intent.  While it is true that decision making 
responsibility and authority in response ultimately reside 
with the incident commander through the unified command, 
other individuals within interagency response contribute to 
various levels of the decision making process.  In this 
regard, the CORP should be developed in a way that supports 
each of these levels, all the way down to the individual 
responder, based on situational awareness, self-
synchronization, and understanding of the overall response 
plan. 
The need for more information depends to a great 
extent on the experience of the subjects involved.  More 
experienced individuals are not as intimidated by 
information as less experienced individuals due to their 
ability to select the most relevant data and since they 
have a more coherent organization of information stored in 
their memory.277  Consequently, they attend to greater 
amounts of information and process this information more 
extensively than do inexperienced individuals.278
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The CORP can support the requirements of deliberate, 
recognition-primed, and incremental decision making 
depending on the decision maker’s requirements.  Of these 
three modes of decision making, the recognition-primed or 
naturalistic mode is the most difficult to support but is 
effectively addressed through a CORP. 
The advantages to selecting the deliberate decision 
model is that it should result in reliable decisions, it is 
quantitative, it helps novices determine what they don’t 
know, it is rigorous, and it is a general strategy that 
could be applied in any situation.279  There are phases of 
response operations where this model is appropriate to 
employ, but there are also many instances when time or 
information constraints inhibit it use, forcing responders 
to rely on the recognition-primed or incremental 
approaches. 
Deliberate decision making in response is appropriate 
when: 
• Time is available and a choice either requires or 
may require justification by higher authorities 
at a later date 
• When conflict resolution is a factor among 
stakeholders, as could be encountered in a 
unified command 
• When optimization is the preferred outcome280 
Recognition-primed decision making is an important 
skill when confronted with the dynamic conditions present 
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in response operations.  “New information may be received, 
or old information invalidated, and the goals can become 
radically transformed.”281  Klein’s research on how people 
make decisions in high pressure environments has shown that 
an average situational change of five times per incident 
was faced by both first responders and military personnel 
and that these two groups used similar strategies to make 
decisions.282
Recognition-primed decision making is enabled by the 
CORP and has been shown to be appropriate under the 
following circumstances that are frequently encountered in 
response operations: 
• When time pressure is great and it would take too 
much time to identify all possible alternative 
courses of action and analyze evaluation criteria 
• When people are experienced in their domain, as 
will be the case when first responders are 
employed within their area of expertise or 
representing their individual disciplines in a 
unified command 
• When conditions are significantly dynamic that 
time and effort expended on deliberate analysis 
can be rendered useless when the context shifts 
• When goals are ill-defined so that evaluation 
criteria is difficult to define283 
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Incremental decision making in response is a 
compromise strategy that can be used to leverage strengths 
of both the deliberate and recognition-primed methods as 
mentioned in the previous chapter.  In any case, the CORP 
facilitates each of these methods of decision making and 
can be filtered or tailored by each organizational level to 
meet its unique needs and requirements. 
The ability to communicate effectively among 
interagency partners is fundamental to response operations.  
Network-centric response will not only establish 
communications connectivity but will produced increased 
response mission effectiveness through information access 
and sharing, improved situational awareness, self-
synchronization, collaboration, and speed of command and 
decision making.  The NRP established a single, 
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management that 
mirrors the unity of effort found in military NCW 
operations.  Network-centric response provides a means of 
achieving that vision through a collaborative effort. 
The military achieves its objectives by employing NCW 
within the framework of unity of command.  While the NIMS 
directs the use of a unified command, the establishment of 
common objectives, strategies, and plans does not 
necessarily foster collaboration among interagency partners 
as they individually pursue these common goals.  The 
development of shared situational awareness through the 
implementation of network-centric response will lead to the 
organizational and individual self-synchronization that is 
critical to producing a collaborative effort.  Self-
synchronization and collaboration will enhance the ability  
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of the unified command to make timely decisions and 
efficient application of resources that will dramatically 
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V. NETWORK-CENTRIC RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION 
CHALLENGES 
To be considered as a viable strategy for 
transformation, network-centric response must be shown to 
be technically and operationally feasible. 
 
A. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Significant technical challenges must be overcome to 
effectively implement network-centric response that include 
achieving national voice and data systems interoperability 
among first responders and supporting agencies and 
application integration to enable seamless information 
sharing.  Voice and data systems interoperability is the 
critical foundation upon which the essential technological 
and human networks of network-centric response are built. 
Without a technological backbone, reinforced by nationally 
recognized operating and data structure standards, 
organizational desires to improve data sharing and 
collaboration will remain unrealized.  The response 
community lags significantly behind the military in the 
evolution of network centricity in these core areas of 
technological innovation.  While all of the military 
services are pursuing increased process integration leading 
to process innovation and new process employment (e.g., 
Cooperative Engagement Capability and Future Combat 
Systems) through the framework of the Global Information 
Grid, response organizations have yet to achieve national 
voice communications systems connectivity more than five  
 
years after the attacks of 9/11. The current state of 
evolution of network-centric operations is shown in Figure 
7 below.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Evolution of Network-Centric Response Operations 
for Responders (After Network-Centric Operations: The 
Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies) 
 
A properly implemented technological network to 
support network-centric response operations must exhibit 
interoperability; survivability; scalability, flexibility, 
and adaptability; security; spectrum and bandwidth 
availability; and affordability. 
Technical implementation to achieve these 
characteristics will require the incremental move from a 
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series of incompatible stove-piped systems toward a system-
of-systems approach.  To maintain affordability and shorten 
transformation timelines, technical implementation will 
focus on existing Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and 
Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) technologies that are 
available to meet the first two steps toward truly Network 
Centric Response:  interoperable communications and the 
population of a Common Operational Response Picture.  
Without interoperable, resilient communications, the best 
response plans cannot be implemented and unity of effort 
cannot be achieved.  In the worst case, as demonstrated at 
the WTC following the attacks of 9/11, incompatible 
communications can cost many lives to be lost. 
 
1. Interoperability 
The network-centric road to increased mission 
effectiveness starts with core voice and data 
communications interoperability.   A critical mass of the 
response force must be robustly networked as the “entry 
fee” for adoption of network-centric operations and 
transformation.284  This requires a focus on 
interoperability which must not be sacrificed for near-term 
considerations.285  Response entities (centers, units, 
sensors, and individual responders’ equipment) must be 
designed “net-ready.”286  In addition, increased emphasis 
must be placed upon research in developing shared 
situational awareness and new organizational approaches to 
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achieving synchronization.287  Setting national, non-
proprietary standards for interoperability is a critical 
step towards network-centric transformation. 
The DoD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Networks and Information Integration has published a 
network-centric checklist to assist organizations in 
understanding the network-centric attributes that their 
programs need to implement to achieve greater network 
centricity as part of a service-oriented architecture.288  
Service-oriented design focuses on the following best 
practices: 
• Design application and system functionality as 
accessible and reusable services 
• Expose service functionality through programmatic 
interfaces 
• Maintain an abstraction layer between service 
interfaces and service implementations 
• Describe service interfaces using standard 
metadata 
• Advertise and discover services using standard 
service registries 
• Communicate with services using standard 
protocols289 
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“Metadata (information about information) helps 
increase accuracy and extends data use, while context and 
circumstances help turn the data into information.  The 
interpretation of that information by communities with 
specific backgrounds and expertise leads to understanding.  
The process of internalizing these new interpretations of 
information in context leads to the creation of new 
knowledge.  Knowledge and meaning on an individual basis 
enable individual action. Information sharing implies 
availability in multiple places but information sharing 
alone is not effective without context and mutual 
understanding.  Experts may argue about at which level or 
at how many levels the sharing should take place, but the 
objective is to jointly construct shared knowledge, 
enabling meaning and unified action.”290
The network-centric checklist could be adopted for use 
by first responder organizations as they make the 
transformational changes required to implement network-
centric response operations form a technical perspective.  
At a macro level, the network-centric checklist recommends 
the following data strategy: 
• Ensuring that data are visible, available, and 
usable when needed and where needed to accelerate 
decision-making 
•  “Tagging” of all data (intelligence, non-
intelligence, raw, and processed) with metadata 
to enable discovery of data by users 
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• Posting of all data to shared spaces to provide 
access to all users except when limited by 
security, policy, or regulations 
• Advancing from defining interoperability through 
point-to-point interfaces to enabling “many-to-
many” exchanges typical of a network 
environment291 
Candidate systems should allow transmission of not 
only voice and text data, but other data sets as well to 
include video, unit status, positional data, and other 
selectable metadata fields to contribute to and benefit 
from the CORP.  A growing number of Federal, State, and 
local jurisdictions are turning to interconnection devices 
that bridge two-way radio communications with incompatible 
handsets and landline and cellular phones.292  These 
mitigating technologies are technically and fiscally 
effective for current employment until national standards 
for interoperability for first responder equipment 
procurement and operation can be developed and enforced. 
Examples of interconnection technology include 
Communications-Applied Technology's Incident Commanders' 
Radio Interface device, Aegis Assessments' SafetyNet Radio 
Bridge, and Raytheon JPS Communications' ACU-1000.  Vendors 
also offer portable versions for transport into emergency 
locations to blend communications among first responders 
from a variety of jurisdictions.293
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One system under development by the DoD that 
encompasses most of the desirable technological features to 
enable the transformation to network-centric response is 
the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).  By capitalizing on 
emerging software-defined radio technology, the program 
plans to develop and procure hundreds of thousands of JTRS 
radios, which are expected to interoperate with existing 
radio systems and provide the warfighter with additional 
communications capability to access maps and other visual 
data, communicate via voice and video with other units and 
levels of command, and obtain information directly from 
battlefield sensors.294   
Survivability and lethality in warfare are 
increasingly dependent on smaller, highly mobile, 
joint forces that rely on superior information 
and communication capabilities.  The single 
function hardware design of DoD’s existing radio 
systems lack the functionality and flexibility 
necessary to achieve and maintain information 
superiority or to support the rapid mobility and 
interoperability required by today’s armed 
forces.  To support new operational or mission 
requirements, DOD determined that the large 
number and diversity of legacy radios in use 
would require wholesale replacement or expensive 
modifications.  Software-defined radios such as 
JTRS primarily use software rather than hardware 
to control how the radio works and, because they 
are programmable, JTRS offers significant 
flexibility to meet a wide variety of needs.  
Rather than developing radios that are built to 
different standards and operate on different 
fixed frequencies, as was the case in the past, 
JTRS is to be a single, interoperable family of 
radios based on a common set of standards and 
applications.  The radios are expected to not 
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only satisfy the requirements common to the 
military’s three operational domains- air, sea, 
and ground— but be able to communicate directly 
with many of DoD’s existing tactical radios.  To 
facilitate interoperability, JTRS will develop a 
set of waveforms (software radio applications) 
designed with the same operating characteristics 
as many of DoD’s existing radios.  Depending on 
operational needs, different waveforms could be 
loaded onto a JTRS radio and used to communicate 
with a variety of other radios.  In addition to 
supporting interoperability, JTRS is to 
contribute to DoD’s goal of network-centric 
warfare operations by introducing new wideband 
networking waveforms that dramatically increase 
the amount of data and speed at which the data 
can be transmitted.  As such, the waveforms would 
facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to 
support the decision making of tactical 
commanders at all echelons.295
The JTRS or other software-defined radio systems have 
a great potential to be employed for response operations as 
they were created to fill gaps in connectivity that are 
common in the military and domestic response operations at 
all levels of government. 
 
2. Survivability 
Disasters that combine significant damage mechanisms 
with a large geographic footprint, such as Hurricane 
Katrina or the future use of a nuclear weapon, could 
destroy non-resilient communications infrastructure over a 
large area.  The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from a high 
altitude nuclear detonation could destroy non-EMP hardened 
communications equipment in excess of a thousand mile 
 location.  
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“Follow-on terrorist strikes may not be limited to the 
initial attack site.  To complicate consequence management, 
attacks might be launched at hospitals, police stations, 
and emergency operations centers.  Many state and city 
emergency operations centers are particularly vulnerable.  
Often, they lack physical security protection and redundant 
communications.  Back-up centers and mobile command posts 
usually do not exist.”296
“For example, the New York City Emergency Operations 
Center was on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center.  When 
the building was destroyed during the 9/11 attacks, the 
city had no adequate secondary command and control 
capability available.  It took three days to reconstitute 
all the functions and capabilities lost by the destruction 
of the emergency operations center.  In the future, 
terrorists might deliberately attack emergency operations 
centers to replicate such outcomes.”297
A survey of first responder communication systems used 
during the response to the effects of Hurricane Katrina 
that worked included: 
• Interconnection devices that bridge two-way radio 
communications with incompatible handsets, and 
landline and wireless phones 
• Portable communications gear that uses voice-over-
internet protocol (VOIP) technology to send voice over 
data networks, including satellite links 
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• Paging and two-way messaging that sometimes helped 
emergency response teams communicate when voice 
systems failed298 
Systems that failed in the wake of the hurricane 
include: 
• Communications networks that relied on fixed 
terrestrial infrastructures, such as telephone lines 
and cell towers, which were knocked out 
• Incompatible mobile radio systems that couldn't bridge 
communications among local, state and federal 
authorities299 
Even though response equipment should be built with 
survivability in mind, a rapidly deployable communications 
capability is needed to bridge the gap until local 
infrastructure is restored in the event that existing 
communications infrastructure is rendered inoperable or 
destroyed.  This capability could exist with federal 
supporting agencies (e.g., DHS, DOD) or could exist at the 
local level and be deployed under Emergency Management 
Assistance Compacts between states. 
The U.S. Coast Guard uses a portable version of the 
ACU-1000 in a mobile communications unit it calls the 
Transportable Communications Center, which provides 
connectivity among VHF radio, UHF capabilities, and 
Military Satellite Communications systems.300  "We can 
duplicate the communications capability of any of our 
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command centers," said Captain Bob Day, chief of the 
Pacific Area's Communications, Command and Control Division 
of the Coast Guard, based in Alameda, California. His 
division established a mobile command center in Louisiana 
in Katrina's aftermath.301
The dispersed network-based architecture leveraged by 
network-centric response provides its own degree of 
resilience and survivability through the ability to self-
heal and re-form the network when one or more nodes are 
damaged or destroyed. 
 
3. Scalability, Flexibility, and Adaptability 
The fundamental technological and human networks that 
comprise network-centric response should be used on a daily 
basis by all response organizations (e.g., police, fire, 
and ambulance dispatch).  During large scale exercises or 
real-world events of significant scope, individual networks 
using common operating procedures, data structures, and 
compatible equipment could be integrated into larger State, 
regional, or national networks to provide a scaleable, 
comprehensive CORP. 
Expanded Internet Protocol (IP) networks, 
including voice over IP, are other candidates for 
better communications reliability.  Because of 
their ubiquity, IP-based public and private 
networks provide a level of resiliency for voice 
and data communications that exceeds standard 
point-to-point communications networks.  
Networking vendors, such as Cisco Systems, offer 
commercial products that use IP for first 
responder communications. 
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Cisco's IP Interoperability and Communications 
System adds a special router to first responder 
networks that can turn analog voice signals from 
radio handsets into IP data packets.  Cisco said 
the router facilitates interoperability among 
radios that use proprietary and open 
communications standards.  The radios can also 
communicate with other devices connected to the 
IP network, including laptop and desktop PCs, IP 
phones and handheld computers.302
Other communication systems use a mesh networking 
protocol to connect Wi-Fi (wireless) devices without the 
need for functioning access points or communication 
servers.303  “The resulting network is IP-based and lets 
users connect via [personal computers] and personal digital 
assistants.  The mesh technology can turn every 
communications node into a repeater so the network is self-
forming and it doesn't rely on terrestrial infrastructure.  
The network is self-forming enough that as other 
terrestrial infrastructure becomes available, it will take 
advantage of it, so if you have some backup communications, 
you can utilize them.  If you have none at all, the local 
teams of responders can still communicate with one 
another.”304
Once a local network is established, either formally 
or an ad hoc network formed following the loss of existing 
infrastructure, is can be connected into a satellite 
antenna which allows it to be integrated as one hub on a 
small word network that contains the cumulative national 
response picture.  Satellite communication links are 
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important because they extend the range of the network 
globally and act as an efficient way to distribute large 
amounts of data due to the bandwidth and throughput 
available.  Satellite connectivity for all individual 
assets would be fiscally prohibitive and could saturate the 
system if all technology was satellite communications 
based.  Establishing satellite connectivity at critical 
nodes balances fiscal constraints with increased access and 
allows for prioritization of essential information and 
users until increased communications connectivity and 
throughput can be established in a disaster area. 
 
4. Security 
High-quality shared awareness requires secure and 
assured networks and information that can be defended.305  
Cyber attacks on response network infrastructure may occur 
prior to, during, or after physical attacks by terrorists 
or in conjunction with forecasted natural disasters in an 
attempt to impede response efforts and magnify the 
destruction and loss of life.   
If classified military systems are going to be brought 
to bear in support of civil authorities engaged in response 
operations, we must assure that our classified technology 
and sources are not compromised. 
To implement an information assurance strategy to 
transition to a net-centric environment, programs must take 
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management, and digital rights management while ensuring 
that adequate confidentiality, availability, and integrity 
are provided.306
Consideration must be given to balance the requirement 
for information assurance and data security with the 
ability to intended users to be able to quickly access the 
shared data.  Survivability and connectivity of 
interoperable systems, however, remains the critical first 
step toward technical implementation. 
 
5. Spectrum and Bandwidth Availability 
Even if all first responder systems were compatible 
today, they would still complete for space and priority due 
to a limited amount of spectrum and bandwidth available for 
response operations.  Spectrum is defined as a range of 
frequencies available for voice or data communications 
transmission.  Bandwidth, in this context, is defined as a 
measure of the capacity of a communications channel.  The 
higher a channel's bandwidth, the more information it can 
carry.  Certain applications or data formats consume 
significantly more bandwidth that other applications (e.g., 
streaming video versus plain text). 
Television broadcasters are scheduled to vacate 
analog broadcast channels in the 700 MHz band, 
and some of those channels have been reserved for 
public safety use.  These channels are needed to 
relieve much of the congestion in public safety 
bands.  Still, only 13 percent of first responder 
agencies currently use or plan to use this 
spectrum (located between 764 and 776 MHz), and 
almost one-half say they do not currently use it 
nor plan to use it.  The availability of this 
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spectrum may be a factor in the responses to this 
question because broadcasters currently occupying 
the band are not required to cease operations 
until early 2009.  This delay has created an 
element of uncertainty in the planning process 
for new 700 MHz public safety systems.  In a 
related question, 68 percent indicated that their 
organization has not yet determined the 
applicability of this spectrum for their use.  Of 
the responding agencies, 15 percent indicated no 
need or desire to use 700 MHz frequencies.307
In addition to the pursuit of increased spectrum 
availability, new technology is making more bandwidth 
available.  First responders may be able to leverage the 
military’s requirements for increased bandwidth to support 
its NCW capabilities through defense support for civil 
authorities in the form of bandwidth and frequency 
allocation. 
The Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) satellites, due to 
be launched in 2007, will be the DoD’s most capable and 
powerful communication satellites.  The WGS will provide 
near-term continuation and augmentation of the services 
currently provided by the Defense Satellite Communications 
System (DSCS) and the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) Ka 
services currently provided by GBS payloads on other 
satellites.308  “WGS is a high-capacity satellite 
communications system designed to support the warfighter 
with newer and far greater capabilities than those provided 
by current systems, yet it is compatible with existing 
control systems and terminals.  WGS will provide two-way X-
communications as well as Ka-band  
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broadcast services to U.S. Armed Forces and other agencies 
worldwide.”309  “The DSCS system will be replaced by five 
fully operational Wideband Gapfiller Satellites, each of 
which will be able to downlink 2.4 gigabytes per seconds of 
data to tactical users.  The very first Wideband Gapfiller 
satellite in orbit will provide greater capability and 
bandwidth than all the DSCS satellites combined.”310
Beyond the addition of modern technology, a paradigm 
shift is required for first responders to effectively turn 
a user-defined version of the CORP into a useful response 
assessment and command and control tool.  While a complete 
CORP is an invaluable tool resident in command centers at 
all levels of government, bandwidth and physical equipment 
size limitations may restrict accessibility to full CORP 
functionality by deployed individual first responders.  In 
these cases a smaller User-Defined Operational Picture 
(UDOP) may be preferable to a remote version of the 
complete CORP.  A UDOP is a selected subset of the CORP 
that contains only the information that is relevant to the 
user’s need and is displayed in a readily accessible format 
for ease of use.  Several unique UDOPs could exist 
depending on individual agency or responder preferences. 
 
6. Affordability 
We must recognize that some of the stakeholders are 
not going to be able to make the transition to the newest 
and best systems in the short term, so mitigating 
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technologies must be adopted.311  In the future, we can't 
develop and procure individual systems such that they 
isolate others.312   
The results of the National Baseline Assessment 
conducted by the SAFECOM Program show that most 
agencies have at least a minimum technological 
capability to achieve tactical interoperable 
communications.  Whether through mature, shared 
systems or simply through swapped radios, the 
technology that many agencies possess is not the 
primary issue hampering communications 
interoperability. Moreover, each 
urban/metropolitan area has different technology 
solutions because achieving interoperability is 
dependent on the existing types of communications 
equipment and infrastructures each agency 
employs. Therefore, the voice communications 
solution that would be considered ideal in one 
area could be unsuited for another.  As the 
interdependencies of the [SAFECOM] 
Interoperability Continuum [Figure 5] illustrate, 
it is the ability to use technology during 
incident response that allows an area to have 
improved tactical interoperable communications.313
The procurement of common equipment will lower the 
overall cost per unit and will also reduce future operation 
and maintenance costs. 
Network-centric response must become the daily 
standard for normal operations as well as crisis response 
if it is to be successfully adapted by first responders and 
supporting agencies nation-wide.  Technical and fiscal 
achievability are easy to document by referencing 
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initiatives and products being offered by numerous 
corporations to fill the growing market for homeland 
security-enabling technologies.  Organizational adaptation 
with be more difficult to demonstrate, but could be 
assessed by referencing training exercises where network-
centric-enabling technologies were made available to first 
responders and the outcomes and lessons learned from these 
exercises. 
Despite the promise of current technology, the 
critical element to achieving a transformation to network-
centric response in not lodged in technology, commercial 
off-the-shelf or otherwise.314  Network-centric response 
requires that the interagency partners at all levels of 
government, local to federal, make the "cultural change" of 
getting its response agencies to recognize the advantages 
of efficiently interlinking their information.315
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Organizations that attempt to implement 
transformational strategies, vice incremental improvements 
to an existing strategy, must overcome four key 
organizational hurdles.316
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The first hurdle is cognitive, instilling belief in 
the need for change in the stakeholders.317  The second 
hurdle is limited resources.  The greater the shift in 
strategy, the greater it is assumed are the resources 
needed to execute it.318  The third is motivating the 
stakeholders to act to implement the desired strategy.319  
The fourth hurdle is overcoming the collective political 
forces that will resist transformational change, regardless 
of the potential increase in productivity or mission 
effectiveness to be gained.320  Essential to efficiently 
overcoming these hurdles is the employment of decisive 
leadership that focuses on the technology, organizations, 
processes, and individuals that exercise a disproportionate 
influence on the response operations mission 
effectiveness.321
 
1. The Cognitive Hurdle 
A transformational change may be required to reach 
desired goals, but existing strategies feel comfortable and 
may have offered incremental, but small, gains in the 
past.322  Organizations tasked with responding to our 
nation’s disasters must embrace the need for 
transformational change or risk the lack of collaboration 
and persistent mediocrity that has characterized response  
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efforts of the last half decade despite significant 
funding, the best of intentions, and heroic individual 
efforts. 
The current deficiencies in response are well-
documented by Congressional commissions, the Government 
Accountability Office, and a variety of first responder 
organizations, but our nation’s leaders in Congress and the 
Department of Homeland Security have yet to be influenced 
to make anything more than incremental changes through 
increased funding of existing programs and agencies.323  
Even the most ambitious initiatives, such as the National 
Response Plan, have offered incremental change within the 
existing framework of response.  Firsthand exposure to the 
deficiencies in the current state of response and the 
resulting consequences may trigger the need to implement 
the transformational strategy associated with network-
centric response.324
Decision makers at all levels of government should be 
made to leave the safe confines of Washington DC and 
regional command centers to experience the devastation of 
the next disaster firsthand.  Not only would they be 
exposed to the frustration of first responders who are  
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unable to communicate or effectively share information with 
interagency partners to produce a synergistic response 
effort, they would be forced to personally acknowledge the 
destruction and loss of life that results from gaps and 
redundancies in individual organizations response efforts. 
In the absence of the next major disaster, senior 
leadership should see increased participation in State, 
regional, and national level response exercises, such as 
the ARDENT SENTRY series of exercises sponsored by United 
States Northern Command.  It is important that these 
exercises be conducted to stress the national response 
system and not merely validate current capabilities and 
methods through the employment or notional assets in a 
hypothetical environment in reaction to a possible threat.  
Real-world exercise of systems, plans, and personnel should 
be conducted against a significant threat in an as 
realistic setting as possible.  Rather than preplanning 
responses from a known script, organizations should be made 
to react to dynamic events as they unfold to stress the 
requirement for naturalistic decision making and a 
coordinated, collaborative response effort.  Learning from 
failures, in addition to success, should be the goal of the 
exercises to identify and address gaps in planning, 
procedures and response capabilities.  “Coming face-to-face 
with poor performance is shocking and inescapable, but 
actionable.”325
In addition to firsthand exposure to the deficiencies 
in response and the results of these deficiencies, 
leadership should be exposed to the segment of the public 
 
325  Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 153. 
142 
                    
that has been affected by disasters.326  Performance 
indicators that have been traditionally used to measure 
response operations (e.g., search and rescue operations 
completed, forces deployed, evacuees moved, meals served, 
etc) may not accurately reflect the public’s priorities and 
expectations of mission performance by first responders and 
supporting organizations.  Personal interactions with the 
public that was affected by disasters may reveal 
operational gaps and mismanaged expectations that are not 
evident when reviewing numerically-based performance 
indicators and other statistics.327
Once the need to implement a transformational response 
strategy is understood, the strategy must be implemented 
enterprise-wide.  It will not be enough to implement 
network-centric capabilities, conduct network-centric 
operations, and test the theory of network-centric response 
only in a “critical mass of the joint force” or in certain 
high priority municipalities, as we can not anticipate 
where or when the next attack will occur.328  Instead, the 
capabilities must be developed and the theory applied 
enterprise-wide, throughout all levels of government, and 
exercised on a daily basis.  Network-centric response must 
become the steady state of daily operations at all levels 
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2.  The Resource Hurdle 
Using current response strategies, logic would dictate 
that incremental improvements in performance can only be 
achieved with proportion increments in resources.329  
Network-centric response attempts to concentrate collective 
resources on the areas that will result in the greatest 
improvements in overall response; communications 
compatibility and connectivity, and information sharing.  
At the most fundamental level, no collaboration can exist 
within or among the various organizations and agencies that 
are tasked with responding to national disasters if they 
cannot communicate with each other effectively. 
Fortunately, the technology on which a network-centric 
response operates has been developed and is already being 
fielded and improved upon in areas outside of response.  
Specifically, network-centric warfare systems currently 
receive and will continue to receive significant funding 
from the military as network-centric warfare doctrine and 
systems continue to evolve.  Therefore, there is 
significant resource savings to be gained in the areas of 
research and development, technical production, and 
employment techniques when moving to a network-centric 
response strategy. 
Congress has already enacted legislation to facilitate 
the adaptation of existing military technology.  “Section 
1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Technology Transfer 
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leverage DoD’s technological and logistic capabilities to 
assist first responders.”330  Objectives of the Technology 
Transfer Program include: 
• Enhancing the capabilities of Federal, State and 
local first responder and public safety officials 
• Developing an efficient, effective, and 
coordinated process for transferring DoD 
equipment and technology to first responders and 
making those items available 
• Improving compatibility and interoperability 
between DoD and Federal, State and local first 
responders 
• Collaborating on research, development, testing, 
and evaluation of high-priority technology, 
items, and equipment 
• Assisting the national effort to support first 
responders by contributing to the “Enable” 
activities of the Department, as outlined in the 
DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support331 
Current DoD network-centric enabling technology can be 
adapted for response operations under the Technology 
Transfer Program and new products can be developed jointly 
with domestic response use incorporated at all levels of 
system planning and development.  It is important that 
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system development occur with stakeholder input outside of 
traditional military research and development channels if 
the developed products are going to adequately address the 
needs of all potential users. 
The Joint Tactical Radio System received approval for 
the restructuring of their program in March of 2006 to 
address and reduce program risks that the Government 
Accountability Office and others have documented in recent 
years.332  While still meeting key requirements, including 
those related to DoD’s network centric transformation 
effort that would also benefit response operations, the 
revised approach is expected to develop and field 
capabilities in increments rather than attempting to 
develop and field the capabilities all at once.333  This 
programmatic restructuring offers first responder 
organizations a window of opportunity to represent their 
requirements to the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office and 
influence final production designs and capabilities.  
Acquisition of this radio system by first response agencies 
across the nation in significant numbers will not only 
assist in their transformation to network-centric response 
but will decrease unit cost for all users while 
distributing future operational and maintenance costs as 
well. 
If achieved, the transformation to network-centric 
response will lead to a demassification of individual 
agency forces required, resulting in human resource savings 
as well. 
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3. The Motivation Hurdle 
“When most business leaders want to break from the 
status quo and transform their organizations, they issue 
grand strategic visions and turn to massive top-down 
mobilization initiatives.”334  But this is often a 
cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming process and 
overarching strategic visions often inspire lip service 
instead of the intended action.335  Rather than spreading 
implementation efforts equally across all the possible 
stakeholders, it is more efficient and effective to target 
the key influencers at each level of government that have 
the ability to set policy, influence the procurement of 
equipment, and direct response operations.  If these key 
targets can be effectively engaged, they will serve at the 
catalyst to transformation to network-centric response. 
Specific target audiences should include: 
• DHS and DoD, who provide significant support to 
locally lead response operations when the scope 
or capability of local response is exceeded.  
Because their response capabilities could be 
employed in any of the thousands of jurisdictions 
throughout the 54 States and providences, 
compatibility and a common methodology is of 
significant interest to these organizations. 
• State Adjutants General, who work for the 
Governor of the State in a Title 32 status and 
are often employed to assist neighboring States 
under Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
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authority but could also be federalized into 
Title 10 service.  Due to their unique position, 
National Guard forces must maintain connectivity 
and compatibility with both Federal and State and 
local interagency partners. 
• State Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Directors, 
who can enforce conformity within their 
jurisdictions, yet wish to leverage their access 
to information that would be resident in larger 
regional constructs when dealing with disasters 
that affect several States or cross geographic 
boundaries.  These State EOC Directors also exert 
considerable influence over the metropolitan 
areas within their State, allowing individual 
cities and agencies to me motivated and embrace 
network-centric response through their 
leadership. 
Once key influential stakeholders have been engaged 
and motivated to implement a new strategy, their progress 
toward transformation must be based on transparency, 
inclusion, and fair process.336  The current state of their 
individual organizations’ technical and inter-
organizational networks should be benchmarked and future 
goals should be established using a collaborative 
development process.  Progress toward network centricity 
should be monitored and published periodically to all 
stakeholders and explained by each key organization.  As 
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all stakeholders must be involved in the development of 
tactics, techniques, and procedures to best leverage its 
advantages for response. 
Framing of the transformational process is also 
critical to motivating key stakeholders.  When viewed as a 
national initiative, network-centric response can seem 
overwhelming and unattainable at the local level.  
Transition to network-centric operations should be broken 
down into small building blocks at the State and local 
levels with emphasis on local interagency connectivity, 
interoperability, and data sharing among local interagency 
and State partners.  A common operational response picture, 
with subset user-defined operational pictures, can be 
employed to coordinate local police and fire response and 
asset allocation just as well as it can be used by the 
military to run a major theater war.  Scalability through 
common technology and processes will allow the local 
pictures to be fused into a State picture, which 
contributes to a regional picture, which could be used to 
populate a national Common Operational Response Picture.  
Ultimately, a deployed local search and rescue asset that 
participates in the response network could have access to 
overhead information, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
images that were previously only available in national 
command centers.  Each individual responder could 
effectively benefit and contribute to the CORP. 
Governance at the State level must be stressed to 
counter the susceptibility of network-centric operations to 
lead to a federalized central control of assets.  This 
potential should be easier to combat than in the military 
doctrine of network-centric warfare where a strict 
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hierarchal structure (i.e., the chain of command) could 
lead to micro management of tactical assets because 
response operations are already established as being led 
locally with federal entities in a supporting role in 
almost every case.  Improvements to the command and control 
architecture and guidance from the unified command should 
emphasize decentralized execution at every stage.  
“Finally, the temptation to push centralized control up the 
chain should be resisted ruthlessly.  The effort to flatten 
the command and control hierarchy must be examined not only 
through the eyes of the network-centric operations 
technology experts, but also through the eyes of 
sociologists, so that we do not end up destroying an 
already effective human organization only to model our own 
machines.”337
 
4. The Political Hurdle 
“Organizational politics is an inescapable reality of 
corporate and public life.”338  It is essential to identify 
who has the most to gain or lose from the implementation of 
a network-centric response strategy if the political hurdle 
is to be cleared. 
Proponents of this strategy would include any first 
responder organization that desires to increase their 
mission effectiveness through collaboration and teamwork.  
However, sometimes individual organization recognition 
takes priority over the collective effort of several 
organizations working in concert.  The “battle of badges” 
has raged in New York City since it’s founding with Police 
 
337  Springett, Network Centric War without Art, 58. 
338  Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 165. 
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and Fire communities vying for incident control through 
their City Incident Management System and leading to 
equipment incompatibility and redundancy in capabilities 
(e.g., Hazardous material response and search and rescue 
teams).  Professional response organizations such as the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police and 
International Association of Fire Fighters must embrace 
transformation to promote acceptability by their 
membership. 
Organizations that may resist the movement to network-
centric response include the Intelligence Community (IC) 
and, ironically, the DoD.  Members of the IC have 
traditionally derived their power by controlling access to 
information, not by sharing it with outside organizations.  
The cultural transformation from the “need to know” to the 
“need to share” within the IC is far from complete.  To 
prevent the compromise of classified information, 
electronic “tear sheets” may have to be implemented to 
allow access to certain information or intelligence 
overlays only to approved users.  The end user of 
intelligence products is ultimately at the tactical level.  
While sources and systems can be protected, the 
effectiveness of response ultimately depends on the flow of 
information to decision makers at the lowest levels. 
The DoD may not eagerly welcome additional 
stakeholders into push for further network-centricity among 
the military services who are pursuing increasingly swift 
and lethal warfare capabilities.  Response requirements may 
be seen as a challenge to the schedules set for the 
deployment of systems designed primarily to enhance our 
ability to conduct warfare.  The benefits of the economics 
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of conglomeration must be emphasized.  Response 
organization entry into the world of network-centric 
operations should only accelerate the national movement 
toward compliance and system development. 
 
C. METRICS FOR ASSESSMENT 
 
Concrete metrics are essential to establishing the 
degree and level of effectiveness of network-centric 
operations once they are implemented as network-centric 
response.  The outputs of the network-centric conceptual 
framework are mapped to the five measures of effectiveness 
that will be used to assess the ability of network-centric 
response forces to complete the four basic tasks required 
to operate in an Information Age security environment in 
Figure 8.  Completion of the four basic tasks will lead to 















Figure 8.   Mapping of Network-Centric Operations Outputs to 
Measures of Effectiveness 
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Each of the five measures of effectiveness, and 
overall mission effectiveness, will be evaluated using 
criteria developed as part of the network-centric 
operations conceptual framework. 
 
1. Ability to Effectively Access and Share 
Information 
The first measure of effectiveness is the ability to 
effectively access and share information.  This function is 
a requirement within and among interagency partners tasked 
with performing emergency response operations and is 
critical to establishing network centricity with the 
response force.  If this function is not performed 
adequately, the other measures of effectiveness will 
suffer, which will ultimately affect the accomplishment of 
the four basic tasks. 
“Networking involves much more than the physical 
communication links between people and information systems 
that they use.  Information systems in network-centric 
operations must produce coherent information that can be 
transformed into awareness and then understanding.”339  
Information systems that support response operations must 
have the ability to adjust quickly to changing requirements 
due to the dynamic environment in which that information 
exists.  These information systems must produce information 
that is both cohesive and flexible.340
Metrics to measure responders’ and supporting 
agencies’ ability to access and share information can be 
 
339  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 103. 
340  Ibid. 
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broken down into the categories of quality of organic 
information, quality of individual information, degree of 
information “share-ability”, degree of shared information, 
and  degree of networking as shown in the tables below. 
 
Attribute Definition 
Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness Extent to which information is consistent with ground 
truth 
Consistency Extent to which information is consistent with prior 
information 
Currency Age of information 
Precision Level of measurement detail of information item 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
dependent criteria 
Completeness Extent to which information relevant to ground truth 
is collected 
Accuracy Appropriateness of precision of information for a 
particular use 
Relevance Proportion of information collected that is related 
to task at hand 
Timeliness Extent to which currency of information is suitable 
to its use 
 
Table 3.   Quality of Organic Information Definitions (From 




Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria  
Correctness  Correspondence with ground truth (1 = no 
correspondence with ground truth, 5 = full 
correspondence with ground truth). Data matrix 
comprised of relevant information items estimates 
(for instance: detection, ID, location, heading, 
etc.)  
Consistency  Degree of ‘deviation’ from previous information 
Currency  Age of information 
Precision  Level of measurement detail of information item 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
dependent criteria 
Completeness  Percentage of ground truth relevant and needed 
information collected 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision level needed and available) 
Relevance  Proportion of information collected that is related 
to task at hand 
Timeliness  Degree to which currency matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, 5 = high degree of matching between 
currency level needed and available) 
 
Table 4.   Quality of Organic Information Metrics (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Organic information is information that is derived 
from the unit, community, or response organization.  In 
other words, organic information is information derived 
from or gathered by an entity that is not shared and is 
unavailable to the network and, for the most part, remains 
local to the entity.341
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Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness  Extent to which information obtained and utilized is 
consistent with ground truth 
Consistency  Extent to which information is consistent with 
relevant and already existing information (across 
time) for a given decision making  
Currency  Age of information 
Precision  Level of measurement detail of information item 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which information relevant to ground truth 
is obtained 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed for 
a particular use 
Relevance  Proportion of information retrieved that is related 
to task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of information is suitable 
to its use 
Uncertainty Subjective assessment of information uncertainty 
 
Table 5.   Quality of Individual Information Definitions 











Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness  Correspondence with ground truth (1 = no 
correspondence with ground truth, 5 = full 
correspondence with ground truth). Data matrix 
comprised of relevant information items (for 
instance: detection, ID, velocity, location, etc.)  
Consistency  Degree of ‘deviation’ from previously existing 
information 
Currency  Age of information 
Precision  Level of measurement detail of information item 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Percentage of ground truth relevant and needed 
information 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1 
= no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision) 
Relevance  Proportion of information that is related to task at 
hand 
Timeliness  Degree to which currency matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
currency level needed and available) 
Uncertainty Individual’s perception of information uncertainty 
(1 = highly uncertain, …, 5 = highly certain) 
 
Table 6.   Quality of Individual Information Metrics (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Individual information is the first form of non-
organic information that entities in the response network 
encounter.  “Individual information refers to all the 
information available or presented to an entity.  
Individual information provides the basis for awareness and 
understanding.  It differs from organic information, 
because it also includes information that has been 
distributed over a network and obtained through some 
interaction.”342
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Amount of collected information that is posted  
Ease of Use of 
Posted 
Information 
Amount of information which is in a format that 
facilitates use across a range of possible 
applications. Dependent upon the extent of metadata 
and application independent data on network 
Retrievability 
of Information 
Extent to which posted information is easily 
retrieved 
Determined by the following: 
Awareness of Information: Degree to which the 
existence of the information is advertised to force 
member  
Access to Information: Degree to which access to 
information is controlled 
Metadata of Information: Degree to which information 
has labels describing what it is and how it may be 
used (facilitates indexing and searching) 
 
Table 7.   Degree of Information “Share-ability” Definitions 







Percent of collected information posted  
Ease of Use of 
Posted 
Information 
Percent of information with meta-tagging 
Percent of application independent information 
Retrievability 
of Information 
Categorical rating (1 = not retrievable,..., 5 = 
highly retrievable) 
 
Table 8.   Degree of Information “Share-ability” Metrics 
(From Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 
2.0) 
 
“Information share-ability refers to a network’s 
ability to accept, index, and transmit particular pieces of 
information, including data elements, data files, and 
streams of information quickly and accurately.  Information 
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share-ability is only concerned with whether or not it is 
easy to make data or information available to the network, 
and whether data and information can be found by force 
entities.”343  “It only considers whether or not what is 
submitted to the network is indexed correctly, stored 
without degradation, transmitted accurately and on demand, 
and presented to the receiver in a manner equivalent to 
what was initially submitted.  The degree of information 
share-ability is influenced by the physical properties of 
the network, including the transmission speed, accuracy, 















 343 Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 107. 





Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Proportion of information in common across force 
entities, within and across communities of interest 
(CoI) 
Proportion of force entities that share an 
information item 
Correctness Extent to which shared information is consistent 
with ground truth 
Consistency  Extent to which shared information is consistent 
within and across CoI 
Currency  Age of shared information 
Precision  Level of measurement detail of shared information 
item 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which shared information relevant to 
ground truth is obtained 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of shared information 
for a particular use 
Relevance  Proportion of shared information retrieved that is 
related to task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of shared information is 
suitable to its use 
 
Table 9.   Degree of Shared Information Definitions (From 











Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Percentage of force entities that share an 
information item 
Correctness Correspondence with ground truth 1 = no 
correspondence,…, 5 = high correspondence 
Consistency  1 = high deviation from within and across CoI,…, 5 = 
low deviation from within and across CoI 
Currency  Age of information (seconds, minutes, days, weeks, 
etc.) 
Precision  1 = low granularity of information, …, 5 = high 
granularity of information 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Percentage of critical information shared 
Accuracy  Confidence rating 
Relevance  Percentage of information pertaining to the task at 
hand 
Timeliness  Time interval between creation of information and 
when the information is shared 
 
Table 10.   Degree of Shared Information Metrics (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Shared information is information that is derived from 
the network and/or exchanged on the network.  The concept 
of extent separates the attributes for shared information 
from those for individual information.345  This attribute 
measures the proportion of information that is held in 
common across response force entities.346  “The degree of 
shared information captures both the quality of the shared 
information and the extent to which information is 
shared.”347
                     
345  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 108. 
346  Ibid. 




Reach Number of force elements on the net 
Quality of 
Service 
Ability of network to provide a variety of 
communications services  
Network 
Assurance 
Extent to which network provides services that 
facilitate the assurance of information in the areas 




Measure of how large (in terms of number of nodes) 
the network can expand to before notable decreases in 
quality of service and throughput 
 
Table 11.   Degree of Networking Definitions (From Network-
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Attribute Metric 
Reach Percent of nodes that can communicate in desired 
access modes, information formats, and applications 
Quality of 
Service 
Vector of performance metrics, including average 
bandwidth provided (available and bottleneck), packet 
delay, delay jitter, average down time, and data loss 
Network 
Assurance 
Categorical rating from 1 = not secure to 5 = highly 
secure based on a vector of factors (privacy, 




Maximum size of network (number of nodes) that can be 
simultaneously connected in desired access modes 
(with requisite throughput and quality of service)  
 
Table 12.   Degree of Networking Metrics (From Network-
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
In addition to the degree of networking, network 
agility should be measured to determine its suitability to 
be employed in the adverse conditions often encountered 






Robustness Effectiveness of network across a range of 
operational conditions (environments, mission types) 
Adaptability Ability of network to quickly and efficiently: set 
up, shut down, and/or relocate  
Responsiveness Ability of network to quickly and appropriately 
respond to changing operational needs 
Resilience Ability of network to perform effectively despite 
attacks and or perturbations  
Flexibility Extent to which network supports multiple 
connectivity access modes 
 
Table 13.   Network Agility Definitions (From Network-Centric 
Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Attribute Metric 
Robustness Number of differing conditions/environments over 
which network is capable of operating at a given 
level of effectiveness (baseline level determined by 
simulation, analysis, empirical analysis, etc.)  
Number of tasks/missions which the network is capable 
of operating at a given level of effectiveness 
(baseline level determined by simulation, analysis, 
empirical analysis, etc.)  
Adaptability Time and effort (man hours) required to set up, take 
down and relocate network (or significant sub-
components of network) 
Responsiveness The timeliness and appropriateness of the response to 
a change (1 = not appropriate nor timely, … 5 = 
highly appropriate and timely) 
baseline level determined by simulation, analysis, 
empirical analysis, etc.) 
Resilience Number and type of nodes removed before degradation 
in quality of service occurs  
Time lag between attack/damage and degradation of 
quality of service 
Flexibility Number and type of connectivity modes supported (RF, 
wire, etc.) 
 
Table 14.   Network Agility Metrics (From Network-Centric 
Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
A network that exhibits a high degree of agility is 
ideally suited for network-centric response applications.  
Agility in the network will lead to agility in the response 
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force, which will benefit mission effectiveness across all 
four basic tasks required to operate in the Information 
Age. 
Once it is determined that core information access and 
sharing is possible, the contribution of this information 
to building individual and collective shared awareness 
should be assessed. 
 
2. Individual and Collective Situational Awareness 
Individual and collective sensemaking lead to 
individual and collective (shared) situational awareness.  
The creation and maintenance of situational awareness is 
critical to the completion of the first basic task, the 
ability to make sense of the situation.  Individual and 
collective situational awareness can be broken down into 
the categories of individual awareness and understanding 



















Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to criteria that 
are independent of the situation 
Correctness  Extent to which awareness is consistent with ground 
truth 
Consistency  Extent to which awareness is consistent with relevant 
awareness at an earlier time period 
Currency  Time lag of awareness  
Precision  Level of granularity of awareness 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to criteria 
that are determined by the situation 
Completeness  Extent to which awareness necessary to form 
understanding is obtained 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of awareness for a 
particular use 
Relevance  Extent to which awareness obtained is related to task 
at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of awareness is suitable to 
its use 
Uncertainty Subjective assessment of awareness uncertainty 
 
Table 15.   Individual Awareness Definitions (From Network-










Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness  Categorical rating (1 = highly inconsistent with 
ground truth, …, 5 = highly consistent with ground 
truth) 
Consistency  Degree of deviation from awareness from previous 
time period  
Currency  Time lag of awareness  
Precision  Level of granularity of awareness (1 = low,…5 = 
high) 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which awareness is necessary to form 
understanding is obtained: 1 = incomplete,…, 5 = 
complete and sufficient 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1 
= no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision level needed and available) 
Relevance  Proportion of time spent gaining awareness that is 
related to task at hand (not time spent distracted, 
irrelevant, etc.) 
Timeliness  Degree to which currency matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
currency level needed and available) 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of awareness (1 = highly 
uncertain, … ,5 = highly certain) 
 
Table 16.   Individual Awareness Metrics (From Network-
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
“Timeliness reflects the degree to which the currency 
of the information comprising awareness suitably supports 
the use of this awareness for building understanding and 
making decisions.  In other words, timeliness expresses the 
degree to which the currency of awareness provides an 
adequate window of decision making opportunity for the 
decision making staff.”348  Granularity is the level of 
detail at which information is viewed or understood. 
                     
348  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 







Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness  Extent to which understanding is consistent with 
ground truth 
Consistency  Extent to which understanding is internally 
consistent with prior understanding 
Currency  Time lag of understanding  
Precision  Level of granularity of understanding  
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which understanding necessary for decision 
making is obtained 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of understanding for a 
particular use 
Relevance  Extent to which understanding obtained is related to 
task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of understanding is 
suitable to its use 
Uncertainty Subjective assessment of understanding uncertainty 
 
Table 17.   Individual Understanding Definitions (From 











Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Correctness  Correspondence with ground truth-correlation 
coefficient (1= no correspondence, … 5 = full 
correspondence between individual’s understanding 
and ground truth) 
Consistency  Degree of ‘deviation’ from understanding gained from 
previous time period  
Currency  Time lag of understanding  
Precision  Level of granularity of understanding 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Complete, incomplete but sufficient, incomplete 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1= 
no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision level needed and available) 
Relevance  Proportion of time spent gaining understanding that 
is related to task at hand 
Timeliness  Degree to which currency matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, …, 5 = high degree of matching between 
currency level needed and available) 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of understanding (1= highly 
uncertain, … ,5 = highly uncertain) 
 
Table 18.   Individual Understanding Metrics (From Network-
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Collective or shared awareness and understanding build 














Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Proportion of awareness in common across force 
entities, within and across communities of interest 
(CoI) 
Proportion of force entities that share a given 
awareness 
Correctness  Extent to which shared awareness is consistent with 
ground truth 
Consistency  Extent to which shared awareness is consistent 
within / across CoI 
Currency  Time lag of shared awareness  
Precision  Level of granularity of shared awareness 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which relevant shared awareness is 
obtained 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of shared awareness for 
a particular use 
Relevance  Proportion of shared awareness obtained related to 
the task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of shared awareness is 
suitable to its use 
Uncertainty Subjective assessment of confidence in shared 
awareness Decision maker’s degree of belief/measure 
of the decision maker’s lack of knowledge 
 
Table 19.   Shared Awareness Definitions (From Network-












Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent 1 = low awareness in common across force entities, 
within and across communities of interest (CoI), …, 
5 = high awareness in common across force entities, 
within and across communities of interest (CoI) 
1 = low number of force entities that share a given 
awareness, …, 5 = High number of force entities that 
share a given awareness 
Correctness  Correspondence with ground truth 1 = no 
correspondence,…, 5 = high correspondence 
Consistency  1 = high deviation from within and across CoI,…, 5 = 
low deviation from within and across CoI 
Currency  Age of information (seconds, minutes, days, weeks, 
etc..) 
Precision  1 = low granularity of awareness, …, 5 = high 
granularity of awareness 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which shared awareness is necessary to 
form shared understanding is obtained: 
1 = incomplete,…, 5 = complete and sufficient 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1 
= no match, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision level needed and available) 
Relevance  Proportion time spent gaining shared awareness that 
is related to task at hand (not time spent 
distracted, irrelevant, etc.) 
Timeliness  Degree to which currency matches what is needed (1 = 
no match, 5 = high degree of matching between 
currency level needed and available) 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of shared awareness (highly 
certain, … ,highly uncertain) 
 
Table 20.   Shared Awareness Metrics (From Network-Centric 











Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Proportion of understanding in common across force 
entities, within and across communities of interest 
(CoI) 
Proportion of force entities that share a given 
understanding 
Correctness  Extent to which shared understanding is consistent 
with ground truth 
Consistency  Extent to which shared understanding is consistent 
within and across CoI 
Currency  Time lag of shared understanding  
Precision  Level of granularity of shared understanding  
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Extent to which relevant shared understanding is 
obtained 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of shared understanding 
for a particular use 
Relevance  Proportion of shared understanding that is related 
to task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of shared understanding is 
suitable to its use 
Uncertainty Subjective assessment of confidence in shared 
understanding 
 
Table 21.   Shared Understanding Definitions (From Network-







Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Proportion of Command and Control (C2) Elements that 
share a given understanding 
Correctness  Percentage of key elements of shared understanding 
obtained that are consistent with ground truth 
Consistency  Proportion of key elements of shared understanding 
which are held in common 
Currency  Time lag of shared understanding  
Precision  Level of granularity of shared understanding 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Completeness  Percentage of key elements of shared understanding 
obtained 
Accuracy  Degree to which precision matches what is needed (1 
= no match, 5 = high degree of matching between 
precision level needed and available) 
Relevance  Proportion of time spent gaining shared 
understanding that is related to task at hand 
Timeliness  Appropriateness of time required to achieve shared 
understanding in relation to mission needs 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of shared understanding (1 = 
highly uncertain, … ,5 = highly uncertain) 
 
Table 22.   Shared Understanding Metrics (From Network-
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
When individual and collective situational awareness 
are combined with the ability to effectively access and 
share information, these factors lead to completion of the 
second and third basic tasks; the ability to work in an 
interagency collaborative environment and possession of the 
appropriate means to response.  Resources are still 
required to possess the appropriate means to respond, but 
rapid identification and allocation of these resources is 
dependant on collective situational awareness and the 




Synchronization is defined as purposeful arrangement 
in time and space and falls into one of the three 
categories depicted in Figure 9 below.349
 
 
Figure 9.   Synchronization Categories (From Network-Centric 
Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Conflicted actions occur when two or more actions or 
entities interfere with one another.350  An example would be 
one agency sending additional response personnel to perform 
mission tasks at a location that was ordered to be 
evacuated. 
Deconflicted actions occur when actions or entities 
are prevented from interfering with one another by 
separation in time, space, or both.351  An example would be 
assigning U.S. Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR) assets  
 
                     
349  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 90. 
350  Ibid., 91. 
351  Ibid. 
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responsibility for conducting SAR in a defined geographic 
area while assigning State Urban SAR assets a separate area 
of responsibility. 
Synergistic actions occur when actions and entities 
reinforce one another’s desirable impacts on the operating 
environment.352  One example would be combining mass 
sheltering operations with medical assessment teams to 
separate sick or infected survivors from the general 
population as they arrive at mass shelter locations, thus 
preventing additional infections on a large scale. 
The response environment can be highly dynamic and 
feature new and changing threat conditions, unforeseen 
challenges, and novel situations.  Individuals or 
organizations empowered with a high degree of situational 
awareness can recognize changes and take action in this 
environment without further specific command direction 
through self-synchronization.  
Self-synchronization can be measured by assessing the 
degree of decisions and plans that are synchronized, and 





Proportion of decisions/plans that are conflicted, 
de-conflicted or synergistic  
 
Table 23.   Degree of Decisions/Plans Synchronized 
Definitions (From Network-Centric Operations 
Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
 
                     
352  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 





-1 = conflicted, 0 = deconflicted, 1 = synergistic 
 
Table 24.   Degree of Decisions/Plans Synchronized Metrics 
(From Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 
2.0) 
 
Because each jurisdiction maintains a response plan 
that should strive to be based on the NRP and the NIMS, 
explicit, written plans requiring strict compliance are not 
essential in all response operations.  In many dynamic 
situations, particularly in network-centric response 
operations with very flat organizational structures and 
doctrines that encourage self-synchronization, plans may be 
largely implicit, expressed very briefly, and depend on 






Proportion of actions that are conflicted, 
deconflicted, or synergistic  
Synchronized 
Entities 
Proportion of force entities whose positions are 
conflicted, deconflicted, or synergistic 
 
Table 25.   Degree of Actions/Entities Synchronized 
Definitions (From Network-Centric Operations 
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-1 = conflicted, 0 = deconflicted, 1 = synergistic 
Synchronized 
Entities 
-1 = conflicted, 0 = deconflicted, 1 = synergistic 
 
Table 26.   Degree of Actions/Entities Synchronized Metrics 
(From Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 
2.0) 
 
Self-synchronization of elements of the response force 
is critical to completing the fourth basic task to operate 
in the Information Age, the ability to orchestrate the 
means to respond in a timely manner.  Individuals and 
organizations that can, based on overall guidance, quickly 
assess and react to changes in the environment will greatly 
shorten the response timeline.  Entities that take these 
actions in a synchronized manner will increase their 
relative contribution to increased mission effectiveness. 
 
4. Speed of Command and Decision Making 
Despite the network-centric principle of compressed 
operations to eliminate procedural boundaries between 
agencies and within processes so that collaborative 
operations are conducted at the lowest organizational 
levels possible to achieve rapid and decisive effects, the 
human interface at the command level can be the largest 
obstacle to effective response operations.  The military 
experience with NCW has shown that increased access of 
information at the command level has, in some 
circumstances, led to micro management of tactical forces 
which has countered the benefits of self-synchronization 
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and speed of command.354  “Senior leaders often intervened 
at the tactical level not because it was necessary, but 
simply because they could.”355
Measurement and assessment of the quality and agility 
of individual and collaborative decision making is critical 
to ensure that network-centric theory is correctly applied 
to response operations to maintain tactical initiative at 
lower levels of the response force while avoiding the 

















354  Lambeth, The Downside of Network-Centric Warfare, 86; Barnett, 
The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare, 36. 
355  Lambeth, The Downside of Network-Centric Warfare, 86. 
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Attribute Definition 
Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Consistency  Extent to which decisions are internally consistent 
with prior understanding and decisions  
Currency  Time taken to make decision (start time- external 
signal) 
Precision  Level of granularity of decisions 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Appropriate-
ness 
Extent to which decisions are consistent with 
existing understanding, command intent and values 
Completeness  Extent to which relevant decisions encompass the 
necessary: 
Depth: range of actions and contingencies included 
Breadth: range of force elements included 
Time: range of time horizons included 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of decision (plan, 
directives) for a particular use 
Relevance  Extent to which decision is significant to task at 
hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of decision making is 
suitable to its use 




Type of decision making process utilized 
(naturalistic, deliberate, incremental, or other) 
 
Table 27.   Quality of Individual Decisions Definitions 














Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Consistency  Categorical rating 1 = highly inconsistent, …, 5 = 
highly consistent 
Currency  Time (minutes, days, weeks,…) taken to make a 
decision 
Precision  Level of granularity of decision 1 = low 
granularity, …,5 = high granularity 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Appropriate-
ness 
Decision consistency with higher command intent 1 = 
highly inconsistent,…5 = highly consistent 
Completeness  1 = incomplete and insufficient, 2 = incomplete but 
sufficient, 3 = complete 
Accuracy  1 = inappropriate decision,…, 5 = very appropriate 
decision (based on established criteria) 
Relevance  1 = irrelevant to task at hand, …, 5 = very relevant 
to task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of a decision is 
appropriate to the mission 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of decision (1 = highly 




Mode of Decision making (naturalistic, deliberate, 
incremental, or other) 
 
Table 28.   Quality of Individual Decisions Metrics (After 











Robustness Degree to which decision is dominant across a range 
of situations  
Resilience Degree to which decision is applicable under 
degradation conditions 
Flexibility Degree to which decision allows force entities to 
maintain flexibility (i.e., incorporates multiple 
ways of succeeding) 
Adaptability Degree to which decision facilitates force entities’ 
ability to alter the decision, decision making 
participants and/or decision making process and 
implement appropriate modifications 
 
Table 29.   Agility of Individual Decisions Definitions (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Attribute Metric 
Robustness 1 = decision is not dominant to any situation, …, 5 
= dominant across all situations 
Resilience 1 = not applicable under degradation, …, 5 = very 
applicable under degradation 
Flexibility 1 = does not allow force entities to be flexible,…, 
5 = allows force entities to be very flexible 
Adaptability 1 = very rigid, no room for entities to alter 
decision,…, 5 = facilitates entities ability to 
alter the decision 
 
Table 30.   Agility of Individual Decisions Metrics (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
In addition to the attributes of individual decisions 
assessed, collaborative decisions involve the additional 
measure of extent.356  Extent is defined in this context as 
the proportion of force entities effectively involved in 
reaching a collaborative decision.  In addition, the 
definitions of other measures are expanded to reflect the 
shared nature of the process. For example, appropriateness 
of collaborative decisions is measured with respect to the 
                     
356  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 122. 
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degree it reflects shared understanding, unified command 
intent, and shared team or organizational values.357
 
Attribute Definition 
Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Proportion of force entities that reach a 
collaborative decision 
Consistency  Extent to which decisions are in agreement across 
force entities, within and across CoI 
Currency  Time lag of decisions 
Precision  Level of granularity of decisions 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Appropriateness Extent to which decisions are consistent with 
existing shared understanding, command intent and 
shared team values 
Completeness  Extent to which relevant decisions encompass the 
necessary: 
Depth: range of actions and contingencies included 
Breadth: range of force elements included 
Time: range of time horizons included 
Accuracy  Appropriateness of precision of decisions for a 
particular use 
Relevance  Proportion decisions that are important to the 
accomplishment of the task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of decision making is 
suitable to its use 
Uncertainty Inter-subjective assessment of confidence in 
decisions 




Type of collaborative decision making structure 
utilized (authoritative decision making, consensus 
building, majority rule, etc.) 
 
Table 31.   Quality of Collaborative Decisions Definitions 
(After Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 
2.0) 
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Objective Measures: Measures quality in reference to situation 
independent criteria 
Extent Percentage of Command and Control (C2) elements 
participating in collaboration 
Consistency  Extent to which decisions are internally 
consistent with prior understanding and decisions 
1 = low correlation with prior understanding and 
decisions,…, 5 = high understanding with prior 
understanding and decisions 
Currency  Time required to make the decision 
Precision  Level of granularity of decision 1 = low 
granularity, …,5 = high granularity 
Fitness for Use Measures: Measures quality in reference to 
situation dependent criteria 
Appropriateness Extent to which a decision is consistent with 
higher command intent (1 = low, … 5 = high) 
Extent to which a decision is consistent with 
shared understanding (1 to 5) 
Extent to which a decision is consistent with 
shared values (1 to 5) 
Completeness  1 = incomplete and insufficient, 2 = incomplete 
but sufficient, 3 = complete 
Accuracy  1 = inappropriate decision,…, 5 = very appropriate 
decision (based on established criteria) 
Relevance  1 = irrelevant to task at hand, …, 5 = very 
relevant to task at hand 
Timeliness  Extent to which currency of a decision is 
appropriate to the mission 
Uncertainty Perceived uncertainty of decision (1 = highly 
uncertain, … ,5 = highly uncertain) 





Type of collaborative decision making structure 
utilized (authoritative decision making, consensus 
building, majority rule, etc.) 
 
Table 32.   Quality of Collaborative Decisions Metrics (After 








Robustness Degree to which collaborative decision is dominant 
across a range of situations and degradation 
conditions 
Flexibility Degree to which collaborative decision allows force 
entities to maintain flexibility (i.e., 
incorporates multiple ways of succeeding) 
Responsiveness Degree to which collaborative decision is relevant 
and timely  
Innovativeness Degree to which collaborative decision reflects 
novel ways to perform known tasks and/or develops 
new ways of doing novel tasks 
Adaptability Degree to which collaborative decision facilitates 
force entities’ ability to alter the decision, 
decision making participants and/or decision making 
process and implement appropriate modifications 
 
Table 33.   Agility of Collaborative Decisions Definitions 





Robustness 1 = decision is not dominant to any situation, …, 5 
= dominant across all situations 
Flexibility 1 = not applicable under degradation, …, 5 = very 
applicable under degradation 
Responsiveness 1 = does not allow force entities to be flexible,…, 
5 = allows force entities to be very flexible 
Innovativeness 1 = very rigid, no room for entities to alter 
decision,…, 5 = facilitates entities ability to 
alter the decision 
Adaptability 1 = decision is not dominant to any situation, …, 5 
= dominant across all situations 
 
Table 34.   Agility of Collaborative Decisions Metrics (From 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
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When combined with self-synchronization, overall 
response force agility will be enhanced by agility of 
command elements through their individual and collaborative 
decisions. 
 
5. Overall Response Mission Effectiveness 
The ultimate goal of the implementation of network-
centric response is to increase response mission 
effectiveness while adhering to the values of empowerment, 
service, transparency, speed, agility, and teamwork.  As 
stated at the end of the first chapter, a robustly 
networked team of interagency responders will improve 
information sharing; information sharing will enhance the 
quality of information and shared situational awareness; 
shared situational awareness will enable collaboration and 
self-synchronization, which enhances sustainability and 
speed of command and decision making.  These, in turn, will 





Degree to which strategic, political, life-saving, 
economic, social, information, and infrastructure 
objectives were achieved 
Agility The degree to which response force entities were 
robust, resilient, flexible, responsive, innovative, 
and adaptable 
Time Time required to achieve objective 
Efficiency Total cost of achieving objective  
 
Table 35.   Response Mission Effectiveness Definitions (After 








Extent to which the unified command’s intent was 
achieved 1 = intent was not achieved, …, 5 = intent 
was achieved 
Agility See above 
Time Months, days, hours needed to achieve the mission 
Efficiency Vector of cost-benefit metrics 
 
Table 36.   Response Mission Effectiveness Metrics (After 
Network-Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 2.0) 
 
Mission effectiveness must be baselined and then 
reassessed to determine the overall impact of applying 
network-centric tenants, principles, technology, and 
methodologies to response operations. 
Effectiveness metrics share with synchronization 
metrics the need to identify an appropriate level of 
analysis.358  When applying the metrics derived from the 
network-centric operations conceptual framework to various 
aspects of response across all governmental levels, that is 
when it is used to evaluate specific areas of past or 
future response or utilized in specific experimentation 
efforts, the key units are clearly missions.359  Missions 
may include the preservation of life and property, search 
and rescue, damage assessment, defense support of civil 
authorities, containment of lethal effects, public affairs 
campaigns, or maintenance of civil order following a 
disaster.  However, there will often be layers of missions 
assigned to different elements of the response force, in 
different functional areas (logistics, intelligence, etc.), 
and over time.  Therefore, the degree of mission 
                     
358  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 97. 
359  Ibid. 
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accomplishment may differ across these arenas and the 
relevant metrics will include both assigning values to 
individual metrics and “roll up” calculations that create 
mission accomplishment indices.360  As with synchronization 
metrics, time or periods of time may need to be considered 
to accurately reflect the effectiveness of overall response 
efforts. 
 
360  Alberts and Garstka, Network Centric Operations Conceptual 
Framework Version 2.0, 97. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
So far, across this new landscape of conflict, 
the edge has gone to the networks.  Hierarchy-
oriented states must learn to transform 
themselves along networked lines, or they will 
face the increasingly daunting prospect of 
struggling against a rising tide of both civil 
and uncivil networks enabled, and impelled 
forward, by the information revolution.361
 
Our current response operations are characterized by 
the inability to efficiently produce a collaborative and 
effective response to incidents of national significance 
and address the challenges and leverage the opportunities 
of the Information Age. 
Massive funding of homeland security and response 
agencies has made little impact on our nation’s ability to 
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies 
since the attacks of 9/11.  Transformational change is 
required to ensure that all levels of government across the 
nation have the capability to work efficiently and 
effectively together, using a comprehensive national 
approach to domestic incident management. 
The current deficiencies in response in the areas of 
communications, information sharing, situational awareness, 
collaboration, and establishment of a unified command and   
interoperability issues in these areas must be addressed if 
the nation’s ability to respond to disasters is going to 
improve beyond its current capabilities. 
 
361  Ronfeldt and Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the 
Future, 1-25. 
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The military has adapted network-centric tenants and 
principles from business applications to effectively 
operate in the Information Age and increase mission 
effectiveness through employment of a robustly networked 
force to improve information sharing, the quality of 
information, and shared situational awareness.  These 
factors lead to self-synchronization, collaboration, and 
improved speed of command which dramatically increase 
mission effectiveness. 
Governmental strategic vision for improved response 
effectiveness suggests the implementation of network-
centric operations.  The further adaptation of network-
centric principles from warfare to response is facilitated 
by the similarities between the challenges, operating 
environment, and requirements present in military and 
emergency response operations. 
The tenants and principles of network-centric 
operations can be adapted by responders and supporting 
agencies at all levels of government to address current 
deficiencies and increase response mission effectiveness by 
enabling them to accomplish the four basic tasks required 
to operate in the Information Age.   
The implementation of a network-centric response 
strategy is both technically and organizationally feasible 
if key hurdles are identified and effectively addressed.  
Transformation must include not only technological and 
organizational changes, but must include the way in which 
we train, organize, and equip our forces.  While the 
technical network is an enabling force, the human 
networking that results from network-centric response 
operations is the key to empowering individuals at all 
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levels of government and decision making to efficiently 
produce significantly improved emergency response mission 
effectiveness. 
The procurement of interoperable voice and data 
communications technology, the establishment of standards 
for its use, and comprehensive regional communications 
planning is the critical first step on the road to network-
centric response. 
Due to the potential vast geographic and multi-
jurisdictional scope of future disasters, communications 
interoperability on a national level that exhibits the 
optimum level characteristics of the SAFECOM 
Interoperability Continuum (Figure 5) is required.  Without 
a backbone of communications technology that exhibits 
interoperability; survivability; scalability, flexibility, 
and adaptability; security; spectrum and bandwidth 
availability; and affordability, response operations at all 
levels of government cannot make significant improvements 
in response mission effectiveness. 
Strategic Federal guidance may be required to achieve 
a significant degree of network-centricity in response 
operations due to the national scope of response 
operations, but should be tempered with State and local 
stakeholder empowerment and input and responder community 
buy in.  Stakeholder identification and engagement, 
particularly at the State and local level, in the 
development of operating standards and technology will 
serve as a catalyst to future organizational collaboration 
and a willingness to share information through the network.   
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Once the enabling technology is procured or adapted to 
network-centric response operations, it is important to 
“get the theory right”.  Response agencies should learn 
from the strengths and weaknesses of the military’s 
adaptation of network-centric operating principles in the 
form of network-centric warfare and adopt best practices 
while avoiding any drawbacks that have been observed by 
deviating from network-centric operations core tenants and 
principles.  Adherence to the values of empowerment, 
service, transparency, speed, agility, and teamwork is 
critical to obtaining and maintaining critical tactical-
level stakeholder support of network-centric response 
operations. 
Finally, response organizations must continue to 
research further benefits to be derived from the 
application of network-centric response operations that 
have not been experienced by business organization or the 
military.  As network-centric response theory and 
employment continues to evolve, future process innovation 
and new process employment could lead to greater mission 
effectiveness that is not currently envisioned by today’s 
advocates of network-centric theory. 
Future research should focus on practical application 
of network-centric response technology, tenants, and 
principles in an operational environment and assessment of 
the impact on mission effectiveness through the use of 
metrics adapted from the network-centric operations 
conceptual framework.   
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